

# Avoiding the Resource Curse

*Assessing patterns of causality between resource management potential and democratic deficits in neopatrimonial oil countries*

*A case study from Uganda*

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*"For magnificence, for variety of form and color, for profusion of brilliant life - plant, bird, insect, reptile, beast - for vast scale ... Uganda is truly the pearl of Africa. "*

*- Sir Winston Churchill, My African Journey.*

## **List of abbreviations and acronyms**

CIA = Central Intelligence Agency

DRC = Democratic Republic of Congo

DP= Democratic Party

GDP= Gross Domestic Product

HDI = Human development Index

HRW=Human Rights Watch

KY = Kabaka Yekka : Monarchist political party, representing the Kabaka of Buganda. Banned by Obote.

LGBT= Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgendered

MEMD = Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development

NEMA= National Environment Management Authority

NORAD= Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation

NPS = No Party System

NRA= National Resistance Army

NRM=National Resistance Movement

OfD= Oil for Development

PB= Participatory Budgeting

POMB = Public Order Management Bill

SEA = Strategic Environmental Assessments

UN = United Nations

UPC = Uganda People's Congress = Political Party dominated by Northern tribes.

UWA=Uganda Wildlife Authority

## **Ugandan names and expressions**

Baganda = Tribe, plural, people from the Buganda Kingdom, of Bantu ethnicity.

Banyankole (Ankole)= President Yoweri Museveni's tribe. A tribe from Western Uganda of Bantu ethnicity. Shares language and cultural familiarity with the group previously known as Tutsi in neighboring country Rwanda.

Buganda = Kingdom in Central Uganda.


Bunyoro = Kingdom in Albetrtine Graben. Bantu ethnicity, but with a history of conflicts with Buganda.

Kabaka = King of Buganda

The New Vision = Uganda's biggest newspaper, government owned, often accused of being a propaganda channel for Yoweri Museveni and the NRM. Daily circulation of around 32,399 (Audit Bureau of Circulations of South Africa).

The Daily Monitor = Uganda's biggest independent newspaper, owned by Aga Khan's Kenyan Media group, Nation Media Group. Daily Circulation of around 21,456 (Audit Bureau of Circulations of South Africa).

## MAP OF ALBERTINE GRABEN



Source: Heritage Oil [online]. –URL

<http://www.heritageoilplc.com/images/maps/Uganda%20Map%202013.4-300.jpg>



## **Abstract**

As Uganda is about to start exploiting its petroleum reservoirs, it is apparent that there is a genuine fear of it becoming the next country on the list of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa suffering from a “resource curse”.

Many arrows are pointing in the wrong direction when it comes to democratization and civil liberties. Still, the Norwegian petroleum aid program “Oil for Development” (OfD) has just recently been re-started in the country after having been frozen for some months due to a grand corruption scandal at the Ugandan Prime Minister’s office, where about 30 million Norwegian kroner of aid intended for rehabilitation of northern Uganda disappeared.

This thesis analyses the political condition in present Uganda, just a few years after it was regarded as an exemplary case of progressive development in Sub-Saharan Africa during the period that has been referred to as the third wave of democratisation. Uganda is in the process of venturing into oil and gas activities in the pristine Albertine Valley. On the basis of the extensive literature on political transformation and resource- management/curses, this thesis analyses Uganda’s political conditions for resource management and researches whether and how Oil for Development can benefit Uganda and other developing countries with similar opportunities and challenges.



# 1. CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTION.

These are the issues I wanted to shed light on and the questions I wanted to answer:

*Is Uganda facing a resource curse? There is now quite an extensive literature on the resource curse; to what extent does the emerging situation in Uganda correspond to the various manifestations of this problem?*

*What is the nature of the current political regime in Uganda and is Norwegian petroleum aid compatible with Norway's stated emphasis on substantial democratization and human rights?*

In traditional democracy and democratization assessments, one aims at establishing whether a democracy is substantive and includes intrinsic values such as “participation, authorization, representation, accountability, transparency, responsiveness and solidarity” (Törnquist 2013 : 3), as opposed to a procedural definition which merely focuses on the implementation of the “right” institutions. In such assessments, one also analyzes whether one is looking at a democracy in a minimal definition of the word with only limited opportunities for participation as opposed to a democracy in a maximal definition of the word, as well as whether one can talk about a substantial democracy or democratization.

Many countries introduced seemingly democratic institutions and systems in the “wave” of democratization from the mid 1970's and onwards. However, these processes have in many places been altered away from democratic intentions into institutions which only serve the purpose of renewing and legitimating the dominant elites' power over the majority of the constituencies. This “elite crafting” happens both by traditional clientelism, by unmatched access to economic resources, national media and political campaigning, as well as by the use of authoritarian force through physical and symbolic violence.

The Norwegian development aid scheme “Oil for Development” (OfD) is involved in assisting several such countries with “hybrid” regimes in constructing efficient and well organized systems of oil and gas management. No attempts seem to be done by OfD to promote democratization, not even when working with regimes that have constructed their power on the basis of un-even distribution and systematic oppression of all opposition.

The nature of these regimes is seldom brought up in the Norwegian public debate. Few Norwegians know who Yoweri Museveni is, and even fewer know that he is the current leader in the world who has received most development aid from Norway; 6 billion Norwegian Kroner since he came into power in 1986 (Aspunvik 24.2.214). This seems to match poorly with the picture Norway paints of itself domestically, where “more democracy, more openness” have become a mantra meant to describe Norwegian virtues.

I find it important to question why this kind of development aid has become so de-politicized despite its highly political implications. I also wanted to understand the potential effects such assistance has on both the suppressors (who are OfD’s partners), and on the suppressed – “the demos”.

Looking at earlier examples, there seems to be a clear correlation between undemocratic regimes and “resource curses”. There is therefore reason to question why Norway is involved in assisting such regimes in establishing successful oil and gas sectors. Have Norwegian politicians not thought about the broader structures that are crucial to creating resource management which fosters equitable development, or is Norway involved in oil and gas activities in such countries because they offer attractive short term solutions of strengthening Norway’s comparative advantages in the oil and gas sector. If the latter is true, is OfD anything more than an opportunity for Norway to take advantage of environmentally destructive production and raw materials from the Global South?

## 2. INTRODUCTION AND RATIONALE.

Uganda is of special interest when seen from a Norwegian-aid point of view. The country is the 10<sup>th</sup> historically biggest recipient of Norwegian development-aid (Skarstein 2012 : 7), and part of East Africa; a long standing priority-area for Norwegian development aid.

As the country now ventures into oil and gas activities, expectations among some segments of the population are high. It might seem like the country has gotten a golden opportunity to enrich itself on the same resources that made Norway one of the world's most wealthy nations. The outcome of resource management in any country today is determined by its stakeholders' willingness to learn from the successes and faults committed by countries that have been through a similar process. The Norwegian petroleum aid scheme Oil for Development has been established in several developing countries with emerging oil and gas sectors in order to assist policymakers in taking good management decisions based on Norway's experiences in the field. However, several of the regimes OfD has partnered with have serious issues when it comes to democratization and human rights.

Norway is among the few countries in the world that is regarded as having managed to make very good use of a high natural resource based income (Sætre 2010 : 244). The country is often held up as evidence that it's possible to avoid the so called resource curse, even with an economy fueled by petroleum. This has been the basis of the rationale to establish the Norwegian petroleum aid program Oil for Development. The program aims at helping countries with developing economies to establish successful models of oil and gas management, by giving stakeholders insight into the Norwegian experiences gained during four decades of prosperous petroleum activities.

*“OfD is a unique program where Norway can make a real difference based on our experiences.” (Norad.no)*

However, there are reasons to question whether the “success-story” presented as the “Norwegian model” offers a rather limited explanation of the Norwegian model. Despite its good intentions, when partnering with hybrid regimes in developing countries, it seems like OfD might unintentionally help promote a very different kind of development than the transformative process that Norway itself went through during the last century.

I will argue that the democratic transformation into what has been called the Scandinavian welfare model constitutes the basis of the system of resource management which today is promoted as the “Norwegian model”. Despite this, the Norwegian petroleum aid discourse has become depoliticized together with most of the literature written about Norway’s success-story in resource management. No emphasis is given to the broader pre-conditions that were in place that enabled Norway to achieve successful resource management. As an alternative to promoting more substantial democratization, OfD seem to be technocratic, focusing on entities within the resource management model only, instead of looking at the broader societal structures in which these have been constructed.

Successful resource management can then further be used as a tool for authoritarian leaders to maintain their power and strengthen the symbolic and economic capital that keeps them in their positions. Looking at other historical examples, there seems to be a clear correlation showing that the chances of getting rid of authoritarian and hybrid regimes decreases drastically when these leaders get their hands on high amounts of income due to valuable natural resource revenues. There are two key attributes that developing countries with emerging petrol industries must have in order to succeed in their resource management. Firstly, good governance is at the heart of all effective examples of good resource management. The second important factor is well designed legislation (Donyinah in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 23). Even though Uganda for many years has had a bad trend in civil liberties and democratization, aid continues to

flow through the Norwegian petroleum aid tap and this collaboration seems to go on without conditionality on these issues. In this thesis, I shall argue that when promoting resource management based on Norwegian experiences without emphasizing the democratic political pre-conditions, Norway misses out on a unique opportunity to advocate for inclusive economic growth and more substantial democratization in developing countries where emerging democratic institutions have been crafted into instruments for the countries' elite to maintain their power.

The chance for a country to establish a system of resource management that fosters inclusive development and more substantial democratization is very limited under a neopatrimonial structure. The African oil-nations Angola and Equatorial Guinea are good examples of this. Both countries have leaders presently serving in their 34<sup>th</sup> year in power and both countries are controlled by a small extremely rich elite at the cost of a majority which is very poor despite enormous oil and gas revenues.

When it comes to Angola, it is at the same time widely believed that their contact with the Norwegian petroleum sector through OfD was part of the reason the Norwegian state owned oil company Statoil has landed huge contracts on offshore drilling in the country; making Angola the biggest contributor in volume to Statoil's production outside Norway. As one of my interviewees from OfD said:

*“If one has a major “Oil for Development” project in Angola, then a Norwegian oil minister and a Norwegian Energy Minister or Agriculture Minister can go down and meet his counterpart on completely different terms than if Norway terminates all goodwill projects and only runs hard business.” (Interviewee 2: Norwegian working for Oil for Development in Uganda.)*

A claim that can be illustrated by the well-known pictures of two members of the Norwegian government at the time; Minister of Environment and Development (foreign aid) Erik Solheim accompanied by the Minister of Industry Trond Giske,

together with Norwegian and Angolan businessmen on Luanda's shining new waterfront in November 2011.<sup>1</sup>

So why is Norwegian petroleum aid cooperating so closely with corrupt regimes seemingly with no conditionality in terms of democratization and human rights, even when democracy and human rights are emphasized so clearly as “Norwegian virtues”?

One can imagine several reasons for depoliticizing the Norwegian success-story in resource management when promoting “the Norwegian model” in developing countries. Norwegian politicians, diplomats and stakeholders in OfD might not have thought about how important the pre-conditions for Norway's development success were. It might also be because of a principle of respecting other countries' sovereignty by not getting involved in their domestic politics. However, if this is the motive then the concept of not getting involved might have to be redefined as partnering up with authoritarian hybrid regimes unquestionably is a form of involvement. The most likely motive for not promoting transformative politics through development aid is a deliberate diplomatic policy of promoting Norwegian foreign politics and interests by not bringing up any sensitive issues that could offend local and international players. Norway's petroleum aid is also a tool of promoting Norway in the world, and especially promoting the Norwegian expertise in the oil and gas sector.

*“In Angola, for example, Norwegian industry is heavily involved - not only Statoil, but the entire Norwegian offshore supply industry has contact with Angola. If Norwegian diplomats or politicians want a close dialogue with Angolan politicians, then it is important to buy goodwill through Oil for Development and other development initiatives.” (Interviewee 2: Norwegian working for Oil for Development in Uganda.)*

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<sup>1</sup> Illustration I, appendix.



If on the other side OfD was used to promote more substantial democratization, high taxation, wage compression and welfare-state, it would not only offend authoritarian local elites in receiving countries, it would also not unconditionally be received well among certain neo-liberal development partners.

By depoliticizing petroleum aid, Norwegian foreign interests are strengthened as the country gains goodwill in regimes all around the world. A depoliticized model of resource management does not create any political controversy, like the debates that find place when issues such as democratization, human rights and equality are brought up.

However, when petroleum-aid is depoliticized and instead only becomes a technocratic solution, several other issues arise. Successful resource management can be used as a tool for semi-authoritarian leaders to maintain power and strengthen the symbolic and economic capital that keeps them in their positions. This might furthermore make it even harder for the opposition to compete for power. There is reason to wonder why there is not a stronger focus on more substantial democratization wherever OfD is heavily involved in the important pre-extraction process. Historical examples show us a clear causal pattern confirming that the chance of getting rid of authoritarian and hybrid regimes decreases rapidly when the leaders get their hands on high amounts of income due to valuable natural resources. In 2008, seven of the ten leaders in the world that had been holding on to power for the longest time came from oil-countries (Sætre 2010 : 118).

Even though the risk is there, Uganda will probably be able to avoid much of the petro violence seen in many other countries in its neighboring region, since Uganda has a strong army which is controlled by Museveni and his close circle including his son Mahoozi, chief of the Special Forces. However, as I shall argue, the prospects of revenues trickling down from the affluent neighborhoods on the top of Kampala's hills in the prevailing system are small.

When the methods used by the neopatrimonial regime at the same time grow increasingly authoritarian and corrupt; it seems like Oil for Development might have stepped into an ethical minefield by partnering with the regime; at least when seen with the ideals Norway is said to represent at home.

This raises the question of whether Norway is setting other standards for democratisation on other continents by partnering up with authoritarian and nepotistic regimes that repeatedly break international conventions. How far should a hybrid regime be able to go to prevent introduction of more substantial democratisation and still be in a position to continue relying on Norwegian support? In such involvement, Norway also seems to move on thin ice when it comes to reputational risk. Like one of my interviewees stated:

*“...if it goes bad, if there is an accident or the development gets even worse. Then I think people will say, Norway has used so and so many millions here and now we see how that went.”*

(Interviewee 2: Norwegian working for Oil for Development in Uganda.)

The optimistic consensus from the end of the 1980's about an almost deterministic gradual path from authoritarianism to democratic rule after the implantation of democratic institutions such as elections has proved to be too naïve (Tørnquist 2013 : XI). The reason I have chosen to write about this issue is grounded in the experience that there has been a lack of debate concerning which regimes Norway should support through its aid programs, and about which consequences this aid has on the broader political structures in recipient countries. Uganda is the 10<sup>th</sup> biggest historical recipient of Norwegian development aid. The other 9 countries that have received more aid have changed leaders during the last decades. This makes Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, the president of Uganda, by far the present statesman in the world who has received most Norwegian aid.

After getting acquainted with the fact that Uganda had been run by the same leader since 1986 and that this regime all that time has been one of Norway's most important development partners, I wanted to understand what kind of regime this was, and what kind of progress they had made during these past decades. In conversation and interviews I experienced that Ugandans are worried about the turn the political conditions have taken the last decade:

*“Democracy, I think it is not progressing, it's going for the worse - because democracy is a right for people to express themselves. There is no freedom. You find that a decision is being made outside the will of the majority. But it is not what it is. Years ago, probably, there was a little democracy but it is not the same anymore, even that little that was there is disappearing.”* (Interview 7. Administrator, microfinance scheme. Ugandan)

It therefore seems questionable that until recently<sup>2</sup> there has been little or no discussion and awareness about Museveni's regime among Norwegians, and almost no political debate about to what extent this partnership should continue despite stagnation on the democratization and civil liberty issues in Uganda.

It might seem like Norway's development aid discourse is stuck in an outdated development consensus dating back to the 1990's, and that it is time to redefine development aid once more. How can development aid contribute to realizing the substantial democratization needed to foster a more inclusive form of development in receiving countries? Aid which is not crisis relief *is* political. It is important therefore not to depoliticize it. Because of the structural implications foreign aid has in various developing countries, there are reasons to argue that aid should not be made into consistent payments to regimes because they once used to show a will for democratic progress. One could instead imagine a system where aid is constantly evaluated in consideration of the people living in the

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<sup>2</sup> The Norwegian government did decide to freeze and redirect 50 million NOK in budget support following the implementation of the Anti-Homosexuality Law in February 2014. The annual Norwegian aid to Uganda is about 300 million (Aspunvik 24.2.214).

receiving country. It has been a goal for Norway to use at least 1% of its GDP on foreign aid, a good goal for a country which earns most of its capital on export of fossil fuels to the rest of the world. However, giving away money is not necessarily a good thing if there is a lack of discussion about which regimes the aid goes to, and what the aid does to the political structures in the receiving countries.

During my fieldwork in Uganda, I witnessed how a news story that the regime didn't want published resulted in the police closing down all independent media; a violation of the freedom of press which lasted for 11 days. The freedom of press is a sub-category of the freedom of speech. Many of the Ugandans I talked with told me that the lack of opposition to the government is a result of the considerable danger connected with criticizing the regime; often referring to specific cases such as the death of the 24 year old outspoken MP Cerinah Nebanda. Cerinah Nebanda met an early death the day after she, in parliament, questioned the president's honesty concerning his awareness about high level corruption in relation to oil concessions that had been given out in a very un-transparent way. Miss Nebanda died the day after of a poisoning widely believed to have been executed by the regime. The regime on the other side denied these allegations (and made them illegal to express), and claims her death was the result of a drug overdose; an allegation which seems highly unlikely and has been denied by everyone close to her as she neither drank nor used drugs. An independent toxicology test carried out in Israel of the urine sample presented by the police as Nebanda's, showed four times the amount of alcohol that has ever been measured in a human being, a clear sign that someone had been tampering with the sample (Epstein 3.4.2014).

During my last weeks in Kampala, the NRM dominated parliament passed a law making it illegal for three or more people to discuss or express political opinions in public without the consent of the police force (BBC 6.8.2013). The law also eased up on the legislation concerning the police's right to use heavy arms to

disperse protesters. Together with Museveni signing into action the new controversial anti-homosexuality law in February 2014, my rationale for the study seemed to grow increasingly relevant during my time of research.



### **3. METHODOLOGY.**

The field a researcher is studying and the timeframe she/he has for her/his enquiries will influence her/his choice of methods. The methodology used is of importance to how research is structured. The different methods are in combination with analytical thought the researcher's most important tools for gaining a broader understanding of the issue of research.

I decided to mainly use the "case study" with elements of the "comparative study" to gather information for my thesis. I came to choose the "Uganda case" since I already had a special interest in Uganda and had an aspiration of getting to know the political conditions in the country better.

I also chose this particular case, since it seemed particularly relevant for my Master-program at the Centre of Development and Environment. Uganda is in the process of starting up oil and gas activities in one of the world's biodiversity hotspots, aided by the Norwegian development aid scheme Oil for Development. I found the case to be an archetypical contemporary example of the challenges and dilemmas that become apparent in the cross section between development studies and environmental studies.

My analysis was mainly done on the basis of secondary information that I acquired from various written and spoken sources. To gather information, I have been reading dozens of books and hundreds of newspapers, academic articles, interviews, political texts and other sources.

It benefited my work a lot that I already had followed the Ugandan political discourse to a certain extent for approximately three years. I was therefore quite aquatinted with the most discussed issues and with who the prominent actors in its political discourse are. During my fieldtrip, I got a unique chance to build on that knowledge by having conversations and most importantly listening to Ugandans talk about political issues and other issues related to my research.

During my fieldwork which lasted for four months, I also got the opportunity to observe how these issues were talked about by both regular Ugandans and by various stakeholders in the facilitation of the oil and gas industry in Albertine Graben.

To get a deep understanding about my case, I took the time to go on a relatively long field trip. Four months in the field gave me valuable insights into the case that I could not have gotten if I had decided to write my thesis from Norway alone. In particular, it taught me a great deal about the issues of democratization in the country, which was very relevant for my research. With more time in the field, a researcher gets the chance to process more complex information and gets the time to self-correct their own processing errors (Stewart 1998 : 20).

I started my writing-process as soon as I came to Kampala; gathering information, writing and rewriting my text while I was in the field. This made me able to use the information I gained while it still was fresh in my mind. I could write about the suppression of the opposition while I at the same time heard loud bangs from teargas-canisters exploding and gunshots being used to scare people off just a few blocks away from my residence. It is redundant to say that this allowed me to relate more to my issues of research and the master thesis I was writing than I would have if I had chosen a shorter fieldwork and then later started writing my thesis when I came back to Norway. I have aimed at making the thesis follow the same structure as my own learning process. I hope this will make the storyline more engaging for the reader. Learning enough to make a valid conclusion about the case led me through an array of intertwined issues concerning development and environment. The aim of the thesis' structure is to guide the reader through the same theoretical and intellectual journey.

While I lived in Kampala, I also took the opportunity to conduct some interviews which gave me interesting insights into the case. These became a good supplement of information as they frequently gave me new ideas, and made me able to see perspectives of the case that I hadn't seen before, and which I most



probably wouldn't have seen without conducting them. However, I learned even more about Uganda by having many friendly and interesting conversations with Ugandans. Ugandans like to talk, and are very including and not hard to become friends with.

I learned a lot about the cultural and social structures in the country by mostly spending my time with Ugandans. From the moment I arrived at Entebbe Airport I benefited a lot by already having a network there, since my wife is Ugandan. If I had not had this background, my knowledge about the country would probably have been a lot less substantial. It's too easy to end up in an expats community, and in the process miss out on the chance to get close encounters with the African hospitality as a European to Africa. By spending nearly all my time with Ugandans I got to observe how they themselves talked about societal structures and the political development in the country, as well as their expectations for the future. This gave me a more concrete framework to use as a hermeneutical background to understand what I read and learned elsewhere. Thus, my social environment in Kampala was probably not the most representative, since all my contacts represented an urban highly educated middle class, which is very small when looking at Uganda's population in total.

A fieldwork in a developing country teaches one not only about one's case, but also a lot about development as well as life in general. As most young people who start studying development, I started out because of idealism but also with a quite naïve view of the world. Studying and living in a developing country for that amount of time gave me a more multidimensional and realistic understanding of the issues connected with the aim of poverty alleviation. This meant that I also had to start redefining concepts I used to think of as certain, and once again ask fundamental questions such as; what is democracy?

### 3.1 An interdisciplinary approach.

The overarching methodological approach in my thesis is within a political science framework, in particular within the field of transformative politics in a South-North perspective. However, since I study a case which overlaps the span between development and environment, it has been natural to implement a certain degree of interdisciplinarity to my work by combining methods and theories from various academic disciplines. This way of collecting and assessing information is fruitful as it allows the researcher to see the phenomenon he studies from different angles. This allows us to shed light on more relevant factors, and get a broader perspective on the issues. Combining methods makes the researcher able to obtain as much relevant information as possible before coming to a conclusion. This makes both the analysis and the final conclusion more robust. McNeill writes that when one conducts research alone on issues of development and environment, “it is important to be open to a variety of perspectives and methods, and to have a critical attitude to one’s original discipline.” (McNeill in Bjørkdal & Nielsen 2012 : 23)

Even though I have written my master-thesis within an overarching political science framework, I have included insights from political ecology, economics and from sociology in my analysis. In addition to these, I have been inspired by theories from discourse analysis, deriving from social constructionism dating back to Michelle Foucault and the French constructionists in the 1960’s. This has been natural since these theories are an integrated part of the political ecology framework. I find that theories of constructionism also are very useful when one is describing issues of governance, as the theories focus on power, and in particular the power to influence the discourse. These are the most important tools for election and re-election in “grey-zone democracies”. We see to a growing extent that the elite in countries which started their path to democratisation in what Samuel Huntington described as “the third wave of

democratization” are able to craft democratic processes through the use of symbolic capital.

In this master-thesis, I am focusing particularly on the on-going case; Uganda’s “Norwegian petroleum aid assisted” development of an oil gas industry. I wanted to understand whether Uganda’s democratic institutions are capable of implementing advice given by OfD based on the Norwegian success story of resource management, and create a framework that can secure inclusive development in the country. By doing that, I wanted to learn which responsibilities Norway has in such a complex case and how OfD plans to conduct them. The aim for a case study is however not only to learn about a particular case, but also to understand broader structures and causalities. When I started out researching this case, I hoped to learn about the potential effects of Norwegian petroleum aid not only in Uganda but also in other developing countries with somewhat similar political structures.

### 3.2 The case study approach

A case study aims at understanding a wider section of reality by looking at one case in particular (Moses & Knutsen 2007 : 133.) A researcher who chooses the case study as his method believes that he can learn to understand more about a phenomenon on a meta level by looking very closely at one example of it. The case design is based on the belief that the factors that determine the outcome of one process (case) will determine the outcome of similar processes (cases) in a similar manner the next time a comparable situation occurs. This is based on an ontological assumption that causal patterns exist also in societal relations, and an epistemological assumption that we can learn to understand how such processes work. Doing a case study can therefore be said to be an investigation of a phenomenon in a real life context. (Yin 1994 : 13)

My goal was not to reach a conclusion about the final outcome of Uganda’s oil and gas activities, but by analysing this case through the different theories in the

resource curse, resource management and transformative politics frameworks; I hoped to be able to say something about Norwegian petroleum aid's chance to succeed in countries with similar political structures when using OfD's somewhat depoliticized strategy.

My approach to the case study is by what Johannesen et al. describe as a case study based on theoretical assumptions. A researcher does this by trying out rival theories on the case he researches (Johannesen et al. 2010 : 209). I did this by trying out different and competing resource management-, resource curse- and transformative politics theories on the Ugandan case, to see what the most pressing issues are when aiming to develop through a petroleum sector.

However, while studying these theories and trying them on my case, I also learned enough about Ugandan politics to not only see the potential of OfD more clearly, but also to have the ability to make a rather well-grounded conclusion about the most likely outcome of Uganda's oil ambitions. The overarching assumption in social sciences claims that by studying causal patterns one can learn enough about the patterns of reactions following a specific action to predict the likely outcome of similar actions at later occasions. A researcher can be able to make a qualified conclusion about what the outcome of similar future events is likely to be. Moses and Knutsen refer to the case study as history with a point; "Cases of something, where the case is interesting, relevant or "in focus" because of that "something." (Moses & Knutsen 2007 : 133.)

*"Reliance on theoretical concepts to guide the design and data collection for case studies remains one of the most important strategies for completing successful case studies" (Yin 2003 : 3)*

A critique, however, aimed at the case study from the naturalist tradition is that one story is not enough to induct claims of any causal patterns or correlation between phenomena. To counter this risk, I used theories which derive from earlier comparable cases on what benefits the goal of more substantial democratization, and what defines successful and unsuccessful resource

management. When earlier cases make up an important part of the analytical outline, the story becomes part of many similar events, and thereby the researcher can induct causal claims; hence the importance of a theoretical framework in case-studies.

In such a case study, the comparative method can become a natural and integrated part of the method. The case study is particularly fruitful in combination with other methods. Historical accounts, interviews and case studies are commonly used as tools in scientific comparison and analyses (Moses & Knutsen 2012: 118). Even though the case study has been disputed, “there is still *no* doubt that the case study has generated a lot of fruitful work in social sciences” (Moses & Knutsen 2007 : 133.)

An interdisciplinary social scientist researching a “real world” event may also fruitfully make use of historical methods (or the work of historians) to collect data on a particular aspect of the phenomena he is studying. Many of the theories relevant to my case are derived from other historical events. I assume that we can learn a lot about the present by looking at past historical events. The empirical findings that are the basis of my conclusion can in this way be seen as springing from my case study but being analysed through the spectacles of the comparative method. This strategy brings up a common issue of discussion which is relevant for close to all case studies; that of context. A researcher who has chosen the case study as his tool must define where the case starts, and what its context is. These are not necessarily obvious equally excluding entities. To what extent is the empirical data used to describe and analyse the case just describing what the researchers theories tells him is of importance (David XXV : 2006), and to which extent could the researcher have used a different but just as relevant selection of information and gotten a completely different conclusion?

Since I study a case of petroleum aid in a country where many of the problems come as a result of lack of social and political transformation, what have seemed relevant for me have been to assess what made other countries successful or

unsuccessful in terms of resource management and social and political transformation, and what suggests that other developing countries can take advantage of similar strategies. This established a theoretic framework for my case, which further pointed me towards analysing the case using elements of the comparative method.

### 3.3 Comparative study

Norwegian petroleum aid through Oil for development was established with the aim of transferring knowledge gained by Norway's successful natural resource management to developing countries. This means transferring strategies that have worked in Norway to a very different country in a very dissimilar context.

To understand how this is being done and the potential of such an ambitious project, I had to embark on an almost equally methodologically ambitious task; that of doing a comparison between the developmental preconditions in the two countries. I had to ask questions such as: Which pre-conditions were at the basis of the development in Norway and the "Norwegian model" of resource management and how can these experiences be of relevance to Uganda, a country with significantly different preconditions, and in a different historical, cultural and geographic context? Can the pre-conditions in Uganda facilitate successful introduction of the policies recommended by Oil for Development? To research the strategy of an aid scheme which in itself clearly is based on a comparative assumption, I myself had to go into a comparative "space" in my analysis. I did this also because I had gotten the impression that the strategies recommended by OfD are based on a very simplified almost reductionist version of the "Norwegian model"; a version that leaves out the transformative politics that shaped the way of thinking about wealth management in Norway and the ideals that were vital for shaping the country's resource management.

The reason I chose to examine these two cases was in the hope of being able to reach a conclusion about whether oil and gas resources in Uganda and in other

countries with similar democratic deficits can foster economic and social transformation on the basis of the OfD's lessons. If it doesn't, OfD might instead risk giving technocratic support to authoritarian regimes that might use that knowledge to grow even more powerful and tighten their authority.

Norway went from being a poor country in the periphery of Europe, to becoming one of the wealthiest countries on the planet. By comparing the political transformation Norway went through in the last century with the patterns of social transformation in Uganda, I could learn a lot about OfD's strategy. I have aimed at searching for similarities that can prove to become opportunities for transformative politics in Uganda and other developing countries which hope to develop in a similar fashion. Another aim is to identify obstacles which might counteract the goal of development.

Doing a comparative study of any two cases poses several challenges that the researcher has to consider. Comparing two cases as dissimilar as Norway and Uganda creates even bigger challenges.

*“...in studying environment and development it is particularly important to take account of context, and to balance a desire for generalisation with and appreciation of the particular.” (McNeill in Bjørkdal & Nielsen 2012 : 23)*

In all comparison, there are always a range of variables that are unique from one case to the other. One could expect this to discredit the comparative method once and for all. However, even when the number of dissimilar variables seem to be overwhelming, it still does not mean that cases are incomparable, and that no lessons can be learned from one case to another. By “holding up, as it were, one historical experience against another – in regard to particular problems rather than general paths of development – (a comparison) can suggest interesting questions and possibilities” (Chandhooke et al. 2012 : 1) However, such a comparison demands that the researcher becomes even more rigorous when assessing the information in analysis before coming to any conclusion, and

clearly understands that one country's development path cannot be used as a template or model for another's. (Chandhooke et al. 2012 : 1)

### 3.4 Interviews

Interviews are one of the most common methods for collecting data in social sciences. Doing interviews gives the researcher an opportunity to get first-hand information about the case he is studying. However, the fact that the data comes first hand from an interviewee does not necessarily give it more reliability or validity than what a researcher can get by looking at other sources. This is an especially relevant challenge to consider when collecting data in political science research. Politicians are trained to say what the recipients of their message want them to say. I also experienced how much more complicated it is to get real answers on political issues in an authoritarian country where people often are harassed for criticizing the regime. Therefore, I had to take special precautions.

Doing interviews with people working for oil for development in Uganda was essential to understanding their work. And the Ugandans I interviewed whom in one way or another were concerned with development work in Uganda gave me a chance to get a broader understanding about the development processes I studied. My interviewees were sampled because they all had high competence on development in Uganda in one way or another. They did therefore not represent a representative sample of the population. Having a representative sample of the population was not relevant as my research had focus on overarching political structures.

There are many different ways to structure interviews. During my research, I had an interview template which I modified on the basis of which interviewee I was going to meet. Since I picked my interview objects on the basis of their expertise, and most of them were experts in their different development related fields, it was natural to add some questions to the template and remove some with regard to the interview I was conducting. I also spent a lot of time before every



interview to learn all the questions by heart, so I could conduct the interview more like a conversation without having to look in my papers. I think this was a good strategy because it allowed the interviewee to talk more freely as the interview became more of a conversation. It also allowed me to do follow up questions when my informants came up with unexpected information and that made me able to view the case in a different light than I did before.

I tried out different forms of interviews. Three traditional semi-structured individual interviews were conducted one by one. I also did one group interview where I interviewed two interesting people with different backgrounds. I used a digital recorder which made me able to collect all the information and later transcribe it in all interviews except for two. One interview was conducted in a more informal setting during a workshop I attended for stakeholders in the development of oil and gas activities in the Albertine Graben. During this interview, I was not able to record our conversation. I therefore sent an e-mail once more explaining my master-thesis and requested to get a confirmation on what I had understood of our conversation and a copy of what I had written based on that information. I received an e-mail of confirmation before I included it in my pool of information.

My last interview was answered in writing, by a busy Ugandan architect and planner who had no time to meet up with me but still was gracious enough to offer answering my questions per e-mail. My sampling was done first of all by asking people who were involved in OfD or in development in Uganda, and from there by the snowball method.

#### **3.4.1 Interviewee list:**

- Interviewee 1: A minister from Bunyoro Kingdom. (Informal interview), Ugandan.
- Interviewee 2: Person working for Oil for Development in Uganda, Norwegian.

- Interviewee 3a: Norwegian diplomat, (Group interview), Norwegian.
- Interviewee 3b: Human rights lawyer. (Group interview), Ugandan.
- Interviewee 4: Economist in a multi-national corporation based in Kampala, Ugandan.
- Interviewee 5: Business woman and owner of safari-company specializing in tours to the Albertine Valley, Ugandan.
- Interviewee 6: Architect and city planner from Kampala. (Written interview), Ugandan.
- Interviewee 7: Administrator for a micro-finance scheme. BC in Development Studies, Ugandan.

### 3.5 Critical analysis of texts, speeches and the discourse they promote.

In most forms of social constructionism and postmodern theories, it is believed that social reality exists in many different and competing discourses, which people move in and which are constituted by language and power. This is also a vital part of the political ecology framework where theoreticians analyze how natural environments are defined through the use of power and language. I have been trying to understand the different discourses concerning development and environment in the current political structures in Uganda.

The aim for this kind of critical research is to investigate and analyze power relations in society where people's ways of understanding the world are created and maintained through social processes through which common truths are constructed and compete about what is truth (Jørgensen & Phillips 2002 : 7). An analysis of the sustainability discourse under the sitting regime in Uganda shows us how advice from other actors than the ones in power (such as OfD) including environmental assessments are most likely to be managed during the forthcoming

oil and gas industry development. The constructivist claim made by many political ecologists is that both the reality presented by environmental scientists and the reality presented by state management often are arbitrary and serve specific and often narrow political interests (Robbins 2012 : 124).

With this in mind, I have analyzed both how political discourse constructs the reality of resource management in Uganda, and the OfD promoted “success story” of petroleum management based on Norwegian experiences.

### 3.6 Methods summary and reflection on opportunities and challenges during my fieldwork.

To understand the country I was studying, I decided to first spend as much as four months in the field. I left Norway on the 30<sup>th</sup> of April 2013 and returned on the 1<sup>st</sup> of September. The reason I chose to be away for such a long time was because I don't think it's possible to get a substantial understanding of a country without spending sufficient time there, and without getting to know the people living there, their culture and what they are concerned with. It takes some time to get through the “tourist layer” after one has arrived in another country, even more so when the country is on the other side of the world and has a distinctly different culture. The idea of writing a whole master thesis about a country in which one has not lived seemed naïve.

By staying in Uganda for such a long time, I learned a lot about issues such as political structures, demography, and different cultural habits and values in a way I would not have been able to if I had spent less time there. It also made me able to observe things that I could not notice at first glance. An example of this is that after a few months, I was able to recognize ethnic background, while “everyone” at first glance looked quite similar. I could then see who was an Acholi and who was a Muganda (someone from Buganda) with quite certainty. This made me able to start noticing things like for example how most security guards in Kampala are from the Nilotic tribes from the north and east, while most Business

owners who are not of Indian Descent very often are from the Bantu ethnicity in particular Buganda from Central or the Ankoles from Western Uganda. This made me able to understand the tribal structures and the colonial heritage better than I would have done without having spent so much time there.

I also gained some contacts in the Norwegian expats-community in Uganda by meeting up at the Norwegian embassy's functions. This allowed me to make contacts which taught me a lot about Norwegian petroleum aid in Uganda. I got the chance to discuss OfD with OfD's Norwegian staff and with diplomats working with OfD in Uganda. Before I did the two longer interviews I have transcribed with Norwegians working with or for OfD in Uganda, I had several conversations about OfD during three such functions. This gave me the opportunity to learn a lot, which later became important for how I framed the questions in my interviews.

I was also invited to the stakeholder workshop for the strategic environmental assessments for oil and gas activities in Kampala on the 23<sup>rd</sup> of May 2013 through attending one of these functions. Here, I learned a lot by observing the stakeholders' discussions and by having interesting conversations with a diverse range of stakeholders.

I think the methods that I chose complemented each other well. By combining these, I got the chance to use both primary and secondary information; something which was fruitful in the sense that I was able to get new information and this gave me a broader context in which to analyse it.

Since Uganda is ruled by an authoritarian regime on the verge of being a dictatorship, doing critical research there by gathering first-hand information is challenging. Generally, people are reluctant about saying anything that can be viewed as criticizing the regime on record. This is understandable as I was told that the regime have "spies" reporting people who criticize them. According to several of my informants, it is also quite dangerous to criticize them. Stories circulate about how people who question or criticize the regime publically seem

to “accidentally” get killed in robberies or accidents. One person I talked with who was working in a well-known multinational company with offices in Kampala even told me that he never did jobs for the government since the consequences of discovering embezzlement or corruption were too risky. I also experienced that people who first accepted to be interviewed changed their minds, and stopped replying my mails after knowing the details of the interview. People not replying my approaches were in general a big challenge. Few people or organizations seemed to be particularly interested in talking to a master student from Norway who was interested in learning about governance issues in the country.

Living in an authoritarian hybrid regime was undoubtedly the biggest challenge for my methodology, and proved more challenging than I had imagined. My lack of experience with authoritarianism made me feel quite unsure whether the safety issues that apply to people in the opposition applied to me as a researcher, as I was researching a business that involved a lot of money for the stakeholders. I had no reason not to believe that the threats that my informants talked about in regard to being critical towards the regime were un-realistic since so many of the people I talked with mentioned it. I could at the same time read about alleged assassination plans against politicians and military leaders opposing a secret plot of making the President’s son the country’s leader after his father retires. I could also see how the police was shutting down all independent media for almost two weeks when the government didn’t like that they were writing/ talking about this. I also got the chance to get well acquainted with the sound of tear gas canisters and gunshots going off in close proximity to the flat I was staying in.

If there is one thing I wish was different in my methodology, it is the lack of interviews with government officials. The reason this is lacking is first of all because it’s a lot harder to approach these in Uganda than in Norway. I would however probably have tried harder to get more interviews with government officials had my case been set in a more democratic country. Although I had

tried, I had not been able to obtain a research permit before I came to the field. My lack of a research permit together with the knowledge about several situations in the last couple of years where Scandinavians have been imprisoned on very thin charges of being spies in East Africa made me a bit more careful than I otherwise would have been. While in Uganda, I experienced a rising atmosphere of fear and dictatorship. For example, when I was threatened by three police officers for taking a photograph of a building which they claimed housed some political offices.

However, I still think my interviews gave me enough information to elaborate on in my analysis. With the supplement of public speeches and texts written by the leadership, I still got a good overview over their position on the issues I researched. When interviewing political elites, there is usually a small chance that they grant the researcher information which is has not already made public.

## **4. LITERATURE REVIEW / THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK.**

The theme of this thesis is placed in the cross section between development and environment; something which is reflected in the broad field of selection of literature on which the theoretical framework is established. By deciding to analyse the potential of Oil for Development's promoted strategy for oil and gas activities to foster development in a semi authoritarian country with a neopatrimonial leadership structure, I wanted to show how matters of social transformation and environmental concerns in developing countries are closely connected to democratization. Throughout the thesis, I argue that democratization is one of the most crucial preconditions for establishing a successful system for resource management, not only in terms of inclusive development and social transformation, but also when it comes to protecting the environment to the extent that people's livelihoods are secured. What causes the greatest risk for a resource curse socially, economically and ecologically in countries with hybrid regimes, is lack of democracy. Since resource curses contrast what is regarded as good resource management, these are in every sense two sides of the same issue. In fact one could say that a resource curse is nothing more than poor resource management.

I therefore started out by getting acquainted with the leading literature on these highly connected fields. To mention some theoreticians; Inge Amundsen, Phillipe Le Billon, Gavin Bridge, Michael L Ross, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew M. Warner have produced much interesting work explaining the mechanisms behind the "paradox of plenty". By getting to know the leading theories on the possible outcomes of resource management, I also found confirmation that these two fields are very much intertwined with the issue of democratization, as both theories about good resource management and those about the resource curses point at good governance as the most important factor in determining success or

failure. In neopatrimonial cases like Angola, Equatorial Guinea and Uganda, it might prove close to impossible to achieve success in governance without first making significant steps further in terms of democratization. At the same time many statistical analysis confirm that natural-resource wealth obstructs transition to democracy (Ulfelder 2007 : 995). That is also why I suggest that there is reason to argue for the need of more emphasis on democratization when Norway offers a petroleum aid program like OfD.

People in developing countries often have hope that the discovery of valuable resources can lead to salvation from poverty and low human development, and is a promise of a happy future (Røed Larsen 2005 : 75). In recent years however, many economists such as Sachs and Warner have claimed that this ambition is unrealistic, and that in fact large availability of natural resources decreases a country's chances for achieving political and economic transformation. Sachs and Warner (1995) and others such Røed Larsen (2005) and Gylfason (2000) have documented that economies with high amounts of natural resources have a tendency to have a slower growth rate than natural resource scarce economies.

Professor Kwaku Appiah-Adu of Business Management at Central University, Accra edited "Governance of the Petroleum Sector in an Emerging Developing Economy" (2013), with a collection of texts written by experts from all over the world giving recommendations on governance of the petroleum sector in emerging economies. The book is relevant also in regard to analysing Uganda's potential for achieving such development. The texts in the book present several perspectives on the possibilities and dangers of oil and gas activities; many of which return to showing Norway's model of resource management as a model close to perfection.

Norway's ability to avoid the resource curse is often defined as a lesson to other resource-rich countries (Røed Larsen 2005 : 76). Literature based on this idea is in accordance with the idea behind Oil for Development which goes far in the direction of recommending the "Norwegian model" of resource management as a



template for successful resource management, by urging developing economies with an emerging petroleum sector to learn from Norwegian experiences.

However, it might seem like a broader focus on the political preconditions is missing in both much of the literature explaining the Norwegian success story and in OfD's argumentation. The literature I came across focusing on the Norwegian resource management, from H. E. Bergersen & R. Malnes (1984) to E.Røed Larsens (2005), Edvardsen (2008) and Angel (2011) all start the story of Norwegian resource management in the 1960's, right before the oil was discovered, and do not spend time to look at the important preconditions for establishing the system. I raise the question whether this way of looking at the Norwegian success in resource management can pose a problem when OfD is to assist hybrid regimes with an emerging oil and gas sector on the basis of political strategies that have been useful in a post political transformative Norway.

Knowing the correlation between lack of democracy and the resource curse, I found it peculiar that when I read through Oil for Development's official fact sheet - "Oil for Development Initiative – factsheet" and all Oil for Development's annual reports from 2007 – 2012, that the word democracy is used only once; on page 41 in the annual report from 2011, when referring to Shauoob Institution for Culture and Democracy in Iraq.

When OfD is operating in so many countries with serious democratic deficits, it might be a cause for concern that OfD has not found democracy important enough to mention even once in its most important 439 pages of self-presentation and project presentation; at least if the goal is to achieve equitable development in the countries it is involved in. This raises the question whether OfD lack emphasis on the structural preconditions that most importantly counteract "resource curses" and by that miss out on an opportunity to use Norway's authority on resource management issues to advocate for equitable development through political transformation. In countries with neopatrimonial regimes, I argue that there is reason to question whether it's even possible to successfully

translate petroleum resources into inclusive economic growth and social transformation, and avoid the resource curse without first getting democratization on track.

In order to learn more about this, I found the works of several scholars in political science, with a focus on transformative politics in the Global South very fruitful. The framework in the series of books on popular representation and transformative politics edited by professors Olle Törnquist and Kristian Stokke was the point of departure for my analysis on the possibilities of establishing the democratic structures needed to counter the resource curse in present day Uganda.

In “Politicising Democracy - The New Local Politics of Democratisation” (2004), Harriss, Stokke, and Törnquist, criticize the attempts to craft democratic institutions in many of the countries that were moving towards democratization in and around the 1990’s. Törnquist differentiates between three types of popular representation. Substantive representation is representation based on ideas and ideologies. Descriptive representation is standing for attributes that define the constituency, like representatives that are elected to represent a local community or women representing women etc. The last kind of popular representation is symbolic representation (Törnquist et al. 2009 : 11). The problem with this kind of representation is that the candidate who has the greatest capacity to symbolically construct himself as the most worthy representative of the people, does not necessary advocate best for the poor and voiceless part of the constituency. In the second book “Rethinking Popular Representation” (2009), Törnquist, Webster and Stokke, identify problems when it comes to political representation in terms of governance and public affairs as the major obstacles to achieving political transformation and equitable development in the countries that presently face democratic stagnation.

The third book “Democratization in the Global South - The Importance of Transformative Politics” (Stokke & Törnquist 2013) argue for the need for a

more substantial democratization and examine different strategies to achieving it. Stokke and Törnquist argue for an alternative democratic approach referred to as transformative politics. Popular organization and alternative democratic institutions might accommodate more substantial democratization than elite crafted traditional democratic institutions. Stokke and Törnquist et al., further examine various cases of such approaches to democratization, like the case of participatory budgeting deriving from Porto Alegre in Brazil, and the ability in the Indian state Kerala to mobilize participation. Through this they created one of the greatest success stories in human development. (Törnquist 1999 : 146)

Törnquist et. al. argues that we, until lately, assumed that democracy not only is a goal for development but that it also can be used as a means to achieve it. Democratization is one of the most vital parts of what we from a western tradition regard as development. It has been widely believed that by implementing democratic elections, more equitable growth would naturally follow as of the work of an invisible hand of liberal democratization, and that even corrupt actors would turn democratic, following the introduction of national elections or that democracy was the natural condition societies would return to when coercive regime change occurred (Reinert 2007 : XIX). However a decade after the era that Samuel Huntington described as the third wave of democracy (Huntington 1993 : 16), it seems more and more obvious that many of the countries that took their first steps towards democracy during that period have failed to bring more equity and participation to the people, despite the introduction of liberal democratic institutions like elections.

Philippe C. Schmitter has ironically stated that “Democratization and the consolidation of democracy have been so successful because democracy has been so much less consequential than its proponents wished and its opponents feared.” (Stokke & Törnquist 2013 : 43) Many of the countries that have stagnated in un-politicized democratic gray-zones have implemented democratic procedures like regular elections, but have a long way left to become substantial democracies. In

the view of scholars like Thomas Carothers and Olle Törnquist, many of them will never evolve to substantial democracies without implementation of transformative politics that aims to give the power back to the demos. Instead they get “lost in transition” on the road toward that goal (Carothers 2004 : 171 , Törnquist 2009). Elites who hold on to power either through neopatrimonial political systems like the ones we now see in several African countries, Uganda included (Cammarc 2007 : 603), or by other ways of crafting democracy, cannot be trusted to advocate for the needs of the poorest parts of their constituencies, since their continued wealth and power rest on a continuation of the structures which made them rich and powerful at the expense of the majority of the population in the first place.

According to Törnquist et al. there are several types of democracy and ways of defining what a democracy is. A minimal definition of democracy settles for democratic rights for a part of the population. (Törnquist in Harriss et al. 2004 : 202) A century ago, Norway was among the first countries that allowed women electoral rights, but Norway *had* been a democracy also before 1913 in a minimal definition of the word. In the same way the city-state of ancient Athens is known for being the world’s first democracy. Still only free men were allowed to have their say in Athens councils. Very few of us would regard that a democracy today.

According to Törnquist, a maximal definition of democracy on the contrary demands full democratic rights and opportunities for all citizens to participate in the democratic processes, both as electors and as representatives. Many so called transitional democracies postpone giving full rights to all their citizens at once, and settle for a minimal definition in the first round of democratization, based on the argument that law and order and economic growth must come first and that full democratic rights will be achieved later in the development process (Törnquist et al. 2009 : 3); a strategy often grounded in Samuel Huntington’s politics of order (Törnquist in Harris et al. 2004 : 204). We see many

authoritarian hybrid regimes today defend their human rights abuse with such an explanation.

Other academicians within the same field such as Aili Mari Tripp, Paul Cammack, Thomas Carothers and the Ugandan academician Mahmood Mamdani's works on transitional countries have also been important for my analytic framework. Thomas Carothers has articulated very interesting ideas about democratic transformation in "gray zone democracies" and lists five factors that drastically reduce the chances for a developing country to achieve transformation.

- 1: A divided population.
- 2: Lack of experience with political pluralism.
- 3: Non-democratic neighborhoods
- 4: Lack of wealth.
- 5: High concentration of sources in wealth income.

(Carothers, 2007 : 24)

I also used these factors as a backdrop when analyzing how credible Uganda's ambition of fast-tracking the economic and social transformation process on the basis of oil and gas resources is. By having these theories as a fundament, I tried to analyze whether the fear for an "oil curse" is real, or if in fact sustainable development and inclusive growth based on lessons learned by OfD is a likely outcome.

The first commercial oil is expected to be pumped up within the next three to five years. To come to a conclusion about the governance issues that will be of importance for whether Uganda's newfound resources can be a chance for inclusive growth and social transformation, I had to get more familiar with concepts from political science such as neopatrimonialism (Cammack 2007), depoliticization (Harris et al. 2004) and different forms of representation drawing

on Törnquist's theories about transformative politics. This helped me a great deal to understand the way ahead in addition to the likely opportunities and pitfalls for developing countries with availability of resources on one hand, and huge democratic deficits on the other.

The dilemma of resource management is also about environmentally destructive production and environmental protection. Accidents following onshore oil and gas activities often have a bigger direct impact on people's livelihoods than offshore drilling. Environmental protection is therefore also one of the 3 pillars of OfD's strategy.

*"The program is comprised of three main pillars; the resource pillar, the environment pillar and the financial revenue management pillar." (Interviewee 3a: Norwegian Diplomat in Uganda)*

One cannot analyze the ambition of development by petroleum extraction in any country without also considering its environmental impact. Environmental protection is also closely related to power and democratization. Not only because the one(s) in power can make decisions that affect the environment, but also because "*nature*" and "sustainability" not always are given entities, but often concepts that are interpreted and constructed to suit the aspirations of different actors. It is in that sense likely that the actor with the most power and symbolic capital gets to define what the majority feels concerning different environmental agendas and concerns. Political ecology and discourse analysis offer interesting insights into how different discourses define nature and sustainability in different ways; something which makes the outcome of environmental protection vary on the basis of the leading discourse bearer. John S. Dryzek and Paul Robbins have written interesting theory on this, which gave me another perspective for reading President Museveni's speeches and writings encouraging industrialization of protected areas with precious biodiversity.

By having these theories as an overarching framework for analysing the potential of petroleum aid through OfD to foster development in a semi authoritarian country with a neopatrimonial leadership structure, I learned a lot about how closely matters of social and economic transformation as well as environmental preservation are connected to the form of democratization practised in the various developing countries.





## 5. THE CASE

Uganda is part of the East African community and the Great Lakes region. With its wild beauty and diversity of species of plants and animals, it has fascinated explorers and travelers for hundreds of years. Its geographical location right between Kenya and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has given it a unique biodiversity where it is possible to experience both the splendor of the east African savanna and the lush Central African rainforests within a few hours. After decades of unrest and war following the terror regimes of army general Idi Amin Dada and Milton Obote, President Yoweri Museveni managed to bring stability and growth to the country. This has had many positive effects in the country, and once again the tourist industry is blossoming. Uganda was categorized as one of the best trip destinations in 2013 by National Geographic, and the best country to visit in 2012 accordingly to the travel gurus in Lonely Planet (National Geographic 2013, Lonely Planet 27.4.2012). Tourism has in a few years grown to become the second biggest source of income after agriculture in the luxuriant country. New hotels and safari companies are appearing everywhere in order to facilitate everyone from the shoestring backpacker to the high end business traveler.

Norway is optimistically involved in the facilitation and development of a framework for Uganda's future oil and gas activities, sharing knowledge gained through four decades of extracting and exporting the same resource. This is mainly done through the Norwegian petroleum aid scheme Oil for development. Oil for Development is so involved in the important pre-extraction process that they even have been granted their own offices within the main facilities of the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Development's (MEMD) Petroleum Exploration and Production Department in the town Entebbe about an hour outside Kampala. Oil for development is part of Norad's energy strategy, and is motivated by the theory that experiences from Norway's success in exploiting its natural resources

can be transferred to another country in a different context. Their motives are supposed to be “altruistic” (Dypedokk 2010 : 49), and there is no doubt that all the people I talked to who were working with or for OfD have the best intentions for Uganda. However, Oil for Development has still received criticism for their involvement in the Albertine Graben project. It has been claimed that by its involvement, OfD is supporting an authoritarian regime in an un-transparent process concerning polluting oil extraction in one of the world’s “biodiversity hotspots” (Garberg 2012). Like one of their employees told me in an interview:

*“...the ministry of environment in Norway has sent a notification of distress to Norad where they say that they feel uncomfortable with the situation where one sees industrial development in a national park, and that they perceive it as a "reputational risk" for Norway to work closely with a country actually planning to engage in that kind of activity. Norway has to be aware, if something happens, a blowout and pollution - Then people will say that Norway was involved...” (Interviewee 2: Norwegian working for Oil for Development in Uganda.)*

The oil-blocks in Albertine Graben (Western Uganda) are estimated to consist of at least 3,5 billion barrels of crude oil, of which 1,2 billion barrels are recoverable with today’s technology (MEMD 2013, Strategic Environmental Assessment Stakeholder Workshop at Hotel Africana – Kampala 23.5. 2013). This is enough to create substantial growth, and create a fundament for social transformation in the country if the resources are managed wisely both economically and environmentally, like Uganda’s Ministry of Finance, Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy stated in 2012:

*“The discovery of oil and gas provides the country with an opportunity to fast-track the economic and social transformation process.” (Oil and Gas Revenue Management Policy February 2012 : 1.)*

Nevertheless, I have discovered that among many Ugandans hopes are low on any such development occurring as a result of the country's oil and gas reservoirs. Instead there seems to be a genuine fear of a resource curse occurring. Even before thoroughly understanding what a resource curse was, I realized that those who feared such a result probably did so with good reason. Other countries in Uganda's proximity such as the Democratic Republic of Congo and South Sudan have had a large availability of valuable natural resources, but it is clear that those resources have been more of a curse than a blessing. Few regions in the world have been "blessed" with as many valuable natural resources as the countries in the Great Lakes Region (GLR); petroleum, diamond, gold, cobalt, uranium, nickel, tungsten and tanzanite (Marindwa-Rutanga 2011 : 9) just to mention a few. Still paradoxically the same countries seem to be among the worst off in the world when it comes to poverty and human development. Instead of richness and wealth, the words that come to mind in correlation when one hears about the Great Lakes Region are more often words like war, genocide, dictatorship and poverty.

There therefore seems to be no doubt that in order to achieve a sustainable system of oil and gas extraction in Uganda, that can "*fast-track the economic and social transformation process*", these tragedies of Uganda's most resource rich neighbor states must be kept in mind and analyzed before development of a petroleum industry is finalized. Only by learning from past events of the resource curse as well as of experiences from countries which have been successful in transforming natural resources into economic and social transformation, can the oil resources help Uganda towards inclusive sustainable development. Only then can the petroleum resources "*fast-track the economic and social transformation process*" and make a positive difference in ordinary Ugandans everyday lives.

Ugandan policymakers must be able to create a strong legal framework for the oil and gas activities. I wanted to understand whether the current form of petroleum

aid a country like Uganda receives from Norway through OfD is sufficient to ensure such a framework. With the petroleum aid program OfD, Norwegian politicians seem to assume that successful policies in one country can be transferred to another country in a completely different context demographically, politically and culturally.

Albertine Graben is the area where most of Uganda's petroleum resources are located, with its total of 3,5 billion barrels of crude oil (MEMD 2013 : 1). The area is a part of the Albertine Valley, the north western part of the renowned East African rift valley that stretches from Djibouti in North Africa to Mozambique in the South. The Albertine rift stretches from Tanzania, through Burundi and Rwanda and crosses through the western part of Uganda along the border with DRC, all the way to South Sudan. The Rift Valley is known for its unique biodiversity and great array of animal species. The good conditions for life have been a trait of the valley for millions of years, which is the reason the valley today, has proved to contain such large deposits of hydrocarbons. Dinosaurs walked through the valley millions of years ago, and it is also widely believed that this was the place mankind took his first steps. Today the Rift valley is mostly known for its large game parks. Kenya and Tanzania's national parks in and around the valley such as Serengeti and Masai Mara are visited by millions of people every year (Tanzania Tourism Sector 2010 : 2). Uganda is still lagging a bit behind its East African big brothers, but has experienced a boom in tourism to its national parks in the rift the last decade, in particular to the most famous ones Murchison Falls National Park and Queen Elisabeth National Park.

*"We have Murchison falls National Park which also happens to be the largest and one of the largest. Queen Elizabeth National Park -one of the oldest but not as big as Murchison falls N.P. It is the most visited in the recent past."*

*(Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

Both of these parks used to be among Africa's prime game parks by the country's independence in 1962, when the British handed the power of its

imperial protectorate to the Kabaka (King) of Buganda. Political turbulence, wars and extensive hunting during the following decades drastically reduced the number of wildlife in the park. Particularly during Idi Amin's years in power, the number of animals dropped considerably. Bush meat like elephants and hippos was extensively hunted as food for both the army and civilians throughout the 1970's, and during the war against Tanzania in 1978-79 soldiers on both sides are known to have been massacring animals with machineguns both as food source and as a recreational activity between fighting each other (Hanson et.al 2009 : 584). These events led to local extinction and drastic reduction in the total numbers of several species of wildlife in Uganda by the end of the 70's (Eltringham 1980 : 73). However, through deliberate politics during the last decades animal population has once again been growing and tourists have been returning; leaving behind much needed foreign capital.

Culturally, Albertine Graben consists of several kingdoms and ethnic groups. The area stretches through the traditional kingdoms and regions of Kigezi, Ankole, Toro, Buyaga, Bunyoro, West Nile, Acholi and Madi. This means that its inhabitants come from a large variety of tribes with a large range of languages and cultural identities crossing several distinct ethnic groups. The three biggest overarching ethnic groups in and around Albertine Graben are the Nilotic group which historically came up the River Nile and settled in the north, the Bantu ethnicity who came from the south and west and share ethnicity with the majority of the population in neighboring countries Rwanda, Burundi, while the Central Sudanic Ethnic group came from DRC and the west of South Sudan. Also within these overarching groups there are now many tribes, so distinct that they sometimes count as ethnic groups. Albertine Graben stretches from close to the Rwandese boarder, along the DRC, up to the boarder of South Sudan, through Acholiland which until recently was terrorized by Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA). Territorial boarders in these parts of Africa don't follow ethnic groups as much as they follow agreements made by earlier colonizing countries during the 19<sup>th</sup> century. As late as towards the end of 2012,

a UN rapport accused Ugandan and Rwandese forces of supporting rebel groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Kasasira 18.10.12). It is well documented that members of the NRM government have been involved in stealing timber and other natural resources in DRC on several occasions. This has been done to the private gain of several of President Yoweri Museveni's top men. However, the 10 billion dollar fine given to Uganda by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) over this will be covered by Ugandan tax-payers (Akaki 2011 : 3). By January 2013, Ugandan troops went in to stabilize South Sudan, and decided to stay there up to now, despite of being warned that it could contribute to making the crisis into a regional conflict.

Uganda cannot boast of being in the best of neighborhoods when it comes to democratic issues. The Albertine Valley crosses through Uganda's western part, which means oil blocks are found *on* and *near* present and earlier conflict zones in the region. The genocide in Rwanda in 1994 was finally stopped by a guerrilla army that at the time was training in western Uganda. Rwanda is despite of impressive growth rates not yet a substantial democracy. Neither is DRC. And the situation in South Sudan is still unresolved. The unwritten rule of Kenya's democracy seems to be that one votes for the candidate representing ones tribe, with all the signs of patronage at both the local and the governmental level. This has resulted in a president from the majority Kikuyu group, who at the same time is wanted by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for crimes against mankind, following his active role in the planning of mass killings of competing ethnic groups in the post-election violence in 2007. This is also of relevance for Uganda since we know non-democratic neighborhoods reduce the chance of political transformation (Carothers 2007 : 24).

## **6. BRIEF ACCOUNT OF UGANDA'S POLITICAL HISTORY.**

The country Uganda was established by European colonial powers, when its borders were agreed upon by British and German officials in a conference in Berlin the 1<sup>st</sup> of July 1890 (Askgaard 1975 : 17). The country consisted of many small kingdoms, and got its name from the most central and largest kingdom, Buganda. Interestingly, the British colonial power would make an agreement ten years later with the Kabaka (King) of Buganda, making Buganda a British protectorate and giving the Kabaka a quite unique permission to continue as King of the population in the protectorate, on the promise that he would keep law and order in the area. The deal between the Kabaka and the British can be seen as a tactical win-win situation. For the British the divide and rule strategy, minimalized the risk for costly wars in the central part of Uganda, at the same time a valuable alliance was created. Buganda got an opportunity to impose military and political influence over much of the region. This secured victory for the British in the war against Bunyoro Kingdom (one of the most important Kingdoms of Albertine Graben). The British troops needed help from Buganda troops to win and this resulted in that several Bunyoro districts (the lost counties) became part of the Kabaka's kingdom. (Reid 2002 : 205)

The Kabaka of Buganda on his side kept his power in Central Uganda and increased his regional power compared to the other kings. The alliance between the colonial power and the Kabaka went quite well until the mid-fifties when the British laid plans to centralize the power for all of Uganda. This would mean that the Kabaka and Buganda Kingdom would lose their exceptional status compared to the other Kingdoms in the country. The Kabaka crisis came when the Kabaka in 1953 (Okoth 2006 : 65) as an attack on the British plans, demanded independence for Buganda, something which was unacceptable for the British. Buganda is the most central part of Uganda, and it was the main trading centre in

the protectorate. Instead the British answered by sending the Kabaka to exile, which again nurtured a rising tribal patriotism among the Baganda. The deportation was enough to make Mutesa II who never had been particularly popular before very loved by his people, and a radical atmosphere was created in Buganda when the Baganda came together to show support and loyalty to their exiled King (Askgaard 1975 : 55). The atmosphere got so tense that the British had to cut the Kabaka's exile short and bring him back already after six weeks. At his return he had got the status of a hero, and no opportunity was spared for proclaiming Kabaka Mutesa II the winner and the protectoral government a humiliated loser (Askgaard 1975 : 56). However, despite of what seemingly was a huge victory for the Kabaka, Buganda was integrated with the rest of British Uganda, and he therefore lost much of his special authority. Still, the Kabaka crisis re-established the strong alliance between the Baganda and the Kabaka from pre-colonial times.

## 6.1 Independence

In 1962 the independence conference was held in London, Uganda got its independence the 9<sup>th</sup> of October 1962. A poor country consisting of many ethnic groups was about to take its first steps as a united and independent country. The first constitution was to be based on the British system. The British left behind them a system of discrimination established by the divide and rule strategy (Mamdani 2009 : 654), but also infrastructure and some of Sub-Saharan Africa's best hospitals and educational institutions.

The first government of the country was a coalition between the Buganda led monarchist party Kabaka Yekka (KY) which wanted Uganda to become a federal state, and the Uganda People's Congress (UPC) which was led by and mainly supported by people from the Northern Part of the country which wanted a centralized state. This somewhat unlikely coalition was created as a protestant union to keep the catholic Democratic Party (DP) out of office. (Tripp 2010 : 44)



Despite the optimism and natural patriotism that always comes with independence, it would not take a long time before the divergent interests between the different groups would start to appear. The Kabaka who had gotten the chance to lead the coalition, did a poor job in being president for the country as a whole and tried instead to pursue his own and Buganda's interests. He among other things dismissed a referendum on whether the lost counties of Buyaga, Bugangzizi, Buwekula, Bugerere, Buruli and the portions of the counties of Singo and Bulemeezi that Buganda had taken from Bunyoro after they had helped the British win (Mubende Banyoro Committee 1961) should be returned or not. The referendum clearly showed that the popular will was that they should be returned. At the time the Kabaka denied this result, he almost sparked off the first civil war in independent Uganda (Bastian & Luckham 2003 : 94). This opened the chance for UPC's leader Milton Obote, who for a long time had understood how frail the coalition was, to gather support in the parliament. Even many of KY's MP's went over to UPC, at the same time DP got behind Obote. By the end of 1964, one third of the parliament was behind Obote. Tensions between the northern Nilotic groups and the Bantu groups from the central and south-west grew, both in the population, parliament and in the military. With a surprise move Milton Obote was able to change the constitution in 1966. Uganda became a fully unitary state and Buganda lost its privileged position. States that previously had been federal got the same status as the districts. It was decided that the P.M. Milton Obote automatically should become the first president. This made the Kabaka demand Buganda's independence. Not much later, the Kabaka of Buganda Edward Mutesa II, had to flee as soldiers from Obote's army attacked the Kabaka's stronghold. Over 2000 Baganda were killed, (Tripp 2010 : 45) while the Kabaka managed to escape to Burundi, another Bantu dominated country in the Great Lakes Region and then later to London (Askgaard 1975 : 119). For the last time, the Kabaka of Buganda had been the most powerful man in Buganda and in Uganda.

## 6.2 Northern domination. Obote, Amin and Obote II.

Milton Obote started making changes as soon as he came into power, making Uganda a fully unitary state where he dissolved the kingdoms, and started a wide ranging nationalisation process. He also elected ministers from all over the country. This was done as an attempt to unify the nation and create a sense of national unity, even though the actual effect of it was that the power over the country went from the hands of the Bantu tribes to the northern tribes most famously the Acholi and the Langi from the Nilotic ethnicity, but also other Northern groups like Idi Amin's ethnic group the Kakwa from West-Nile (Finnström 2008 : 65). This ignited rage and ethnocentric patriotism among the Baganda, who felt increasingly marginalized. At the same time the country got more and more militarised and secret agents were placed all around the country. The military also got increasingly tribally based. Soldiers and *especially* commanders more and more often had ethnical decent from the Nilotic tribes in the north; the same ethnical group Obote was part of.

However, Obote did try to unify Uganda during his first period as president, and had towards the end of this period started a political agenda popularly called "the Move Towards Left", built on his own political manifest "the Common Man's Charter (1969) which was inspired by Nyerere's Arusha Declaration (1967) (Willets 1975 : 280). The "Move Towards Left" included transition to a one party system and a new constitution which abolished all Kingdoms in Uganda and Buganda was split into four districts.

Obote was also sympathetic towards the Asian Ugandan community; a community which I very well could see many Ugandans until today envy and despise because of their success in establishing businesses in the country. Obote is supposed at the time to have worked 18 hours a day, and spent much time listening to advice from both academicians and businessmen (Askgaard 1975 : 148).

However despite intentions of unifying the country, his popularity didn't grow more than that his General Idi Amin Dada managed to take the power in 1971 by a coup d'etat during Obote's trip to a Commonwealth conference. There are two version of what happened during Obote's trip, Obote's version and Amin's version. Amin's version was that some of his military comrades had overheard a plan that Amin was to be murdered while Obote had the alibi of being outside the country. Obote's version was that his men had told them that he and his entourage would get murdered when they landed at Entebbe airport. (Askgaard 1975 : 151). Whatever is true, Amin managed to overthrow Obote, with support of western nations like Britain and USA which were worried for Obote's move to the left. With Amin taking power, the most brutal period of Ugandan history had begun.

It is estimated that between the start of Amin's rule and the end of Obote's second period in 1985, 800 000 Ugandans became victims of politically motivated murders (Tripp 2010 : 23). Already from the very start, Amin ordered mass executions of intellectuals, politicians and even bishops from the Luo speaking Acholi and Langi tribes, the tribes from the part of Northern Uganda where Obote had his origin (Finnström 2008 : 66).

Amin, however, also spoke for unity between Uganda's tribes and ethnic groups, on the bases of religious tolerance and cooperation between religions; Amin was himself a devoted Muslim. However, like Obote's attempt before him, Amin's rhetoric about unity didn't pay off (Tripp 2010 : 46). Instead new alliances were made. Strong alliances appeared between the Bantu tribes from Central and Western Uganda, in specific the alliance between the Baganda and the Ankole which has become most important in the countries recent history.

From 1966 to 1986, the Northern groups dominated Ugandan politics and kept all the most important positions such as Prime Minister, President, Commander of the Ugandan Army, Inspector General of the police, and head of intelligence (Tripp 2010 : 45). However, with the presidency of Idi Amin, divisions also

within the North itself became apparent. Mainly, alliances were made between the Luo speaking Acholi and Langi tribes, and the Itesot group. These all had a Nilotic ethnic background and cultural kinships with tribes in Sudan and Kenya. On the other side alliances were made between the tribes from West Nile towards the boarder of DRC with tribal familiarity with Congolese groups. Conflicts also arose between Amin's Kakwa tribe and other Northern groups such as the Madi and Lugbara (Tripp 2010 : 46). When Obote returned to power in late 1980, one and a half years after Amin went to exile in Libya after losing his unprovoked war against Tanzania, Obote's forces retaliated Amin's mass killings by conducting similar atrocities in West Nile, the part of Northern Uganda Amin came from.

An interesting observation I did while staying in Uganda was to see how much popularity Idi Amin still has, a decade after he passed away and more than four decades after he was overthrown. I several times heard people talk about all the "good" things Idi Amin did and how they could need a new Idi Amin despite of all the horrible things he orchestrated. I was quite shocked when I heard this, thinking about the brutal political murders. Amin orchestrated the murder of hundreds of thousands of Ugandans while he at the same time ruined the country's economy and its national parks for generations to come. In fact, Amin was often referred to as Africa's Hitler. When I confronted Ugandans that were claiming that the country was in need of a new Amin with this, they answered that Amin was not as bad as people say. However, it is well documented that he was. It seems very likely that the reason for his popularity was the expulsion of people with ethnical backgrounds from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

### 6.3 The age of Museveni.

Yoweri Museveni came into power in 1986. He managed to soon become one of the donor countries favourite partners by saying and at least apparently doing what was recommended for development and democratisation in the country

during his first terms as president. Museveni also managed to create some impressive results during this time. He bettered the security situation in the country a lot, after the chaotic and unsafe period the country had been through for decades. He also liberalized the market which gave him a very high economic growth rate of 8 % - 10 % per year. The growth rate has fallen the last couple of years because of inflation, but is still approximately at 6,7 %. However, this growth has to a very small extent benefitted the majority of the population (Fellesrådet for Afrika 2013 : 217).

Museveni was maybe most applauded for his success in “beating” the AIDS epidemic in the country, which at the time was so bad that Uganda was referred to as the centre of the African AIDS belt, with as many as 15 % of the population infected by the early 1990’s. Museveni was praised for encouraging behavioural change; something which lowered the infection rate to approximately 7 % by the early 2000’s (Green 2006 : 337). The behavioural change strategy is however seen as a failed strategy by 2014 as the infection rates once again are on the rise (Uganda AIDS Commission 2012 : 2). It seems to me like promoting the virtue of abstinence is not as effective a strategy anymore, after antiretroviral drugs got effective enough to take away the most visible stigmas of AIDS.

When Museveni came into power, he introduced a political system called the No Party System (NPS) or the Movement, with decentralized local councils where electives supposedly were to be elected directly from their local constituencies to councils and to the parliament. This was supposedly an attempt to manage the problem of ethnic diversity by denying ethnic groups the opportunity for ethnically based political competition (Bastian and Luckham 2003 : 309).

However the NPS resulted instead in fragmentation of opposition and power beneath the president and his central government, and became a foundation for the country’s current neopatrimonial system. By the time Museveni finally gave into the pressure from donor countries and allowed more parties in 2005, he at the same time took away the constitutional term limit of maximum of two terms

in office as president. At the same time Museveni made the whole existing political structure into a part of his political Movement and political party, the National Resistance Movement (NRM). This party was also based on the National Resistance Army (NRA) which he used to seize power during the bush war. This left him with enormous power over both political processes and the armed forces, and left little chance in the presidential election for main political opponent Kizza Besigye whom he beat by 59 to 37 percent in the 2006 election.

This was however still the closest Museveni has been to losing power, after the 2006 election Besigye has been constantly harassed. This grew increasingly apparent during the 2011 election campaign, when videos and pictures went around the world of the unlucky opposition leader repeatedly being brutally harassed by the police.<sup>3</sup> Besigye is still not allowed to visit Kampala, and his home in the outskirts of the city is under constant police surveillance with militarized police officers ready to arrest him as soon as he tries to “sneak” into the city.

In the 2011 election, Museveni managed to beat Besigye by 68 % against 26 %, much as a result of uncontested resources. When Museveni at the same time is the undisputed leader of the NRM which holds 279 seats in the parliament against 55 in total for the four other parties represented, it is clear that he has absolute power in the country (All election numbers from [www.electionguide.org](http://www.electionguide.org)). Despite the fact that freedoms and the likelihoods for political change are reducing after the implementation of new laws like the Public Order Law, which violates the right to assembly by restraining the opportunity for three or more people to express themselves politically in public, Museveni has still a growing popularity among the population as he to an increasing extent is criticising the west and “western behaviour”.

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<sup>3</sup> Illustration II, appendix.

During my analysis of the president's speeches, I found that 2013 and 2014 have been a crossroad for Museveni. The leader who used to say all the right things the donor countries wanted to hear, has diametrically changed his rhetoric and uses every chance to gain popularity to speak against his western partner countries. This has earned him huge popularity as he now plays on anti-western sentiments among the population, while he before used to get moderate criticism domestically for being too welcoming to foreign investors. Since he also now knows little is left of his earlier high status as "Africa's new generation of leaders", as President Clinton put it, he personally doesn't have much to lose on this strategy; knowing that the forthcoming oil revenues will make him less dependent on aid. After donor countries threatened to reduce aid after the implementation of the draconian Anti Homosexuality Law, he has repeatedly in his speeches said things like:

*"We don't need aid in the first place... A country like Uganda is one of the richest on earth." (Yoweri Museveni's speech on the rally: National Thanksgiving Service' for the Anti-Gay Law : 31.3.2014. Sources: AlJazeera.com 1.4.2014, Hodes for the Guardian.com 2.4.2014).*

Publically discrediting human rights and institutions aimed at preventing crimes against mankind seems to not only have become a way of excusing own vices, it has also become an effective way of earning populist support as one of the African leaders that does not let themselves get intimidated by the pressure of western countries. Statements like these put Museveni in company with the late Gadhafi and Mugabe in terms of earning support on anti-western propaganda.

*“I want to salute the Kenyan voters for the rejection of the blackmail by the International Criminal Court and those who seek to abuse this institution for their own agenda... the usual opinionated and arrogant actors using their careless analysis have distorted the purpose of that institution. They are now using it to install leaders of their choice in Africa and eliminate the ones they do not like.(Yoweri Museveni, Speech on Uhuru Kenyatta’s inauguration as president of Kenya, 9.4.2013.)*

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*“It seems the topic of homosexuals was provoked by the arrogant careless Western groups that are fond of coming into schools and recruiting young children into homosexuality and lesbianism, just as they carelessly handle other issues concerning Africa.”  
(President Yoweri Museveni, speech state house, Entebbe 24.02.2014)*

Despite his huge popularity (according to election results), Museveni has still not aimed at creating a system that in any sense seems just. Dominant positions are in majority handed to “people from Western Uganda” (Museveni’s own tribesmen), and within the government, ministers’ positions are handed out to close relatives. His style of governance shows all the signs of neopatrimonialism (Cammack, 2007) and nepotism. His wife Janet Museveni is the Minister of Karamoja; a rural district on the diagonally other side of Uganda than where their tribe Ankole is based. After appointing his son Muhoozi Kainerugaba as chief for the countries special forces, he severely reduced the chances for ever losing power in a military coup.

An accusation by the northern and eastern tribes is that the country is dominated by “elite tribes” consisting of the tribes from western Uganda where Museveni himself comes from, in particular the Ankole and the Buganda. On the other side, tribes from the east and the north of the country feel discriminated. The Observer (a Ugandan newspaper) found out that out of the 20 heads of statutory authorities sampled, 12 are from western Uganda, six from central Uganda, two from eastern while none is from northern Uganda (Kakaire 16.6.2012). Allegations concerning



similar discriminations when it comes to scholarships and jobs are not uncommon when talking to anyone from Uganda's other 54 tribes. Despite of the stable conditions in the country, there are apparent tribal and ethnical tensions lurking in the background. This might in the long run have devastating results as a result of the lack of political plurality and more substantial democratization.

In May 2013 during the start of my fieldwork, Museveni's earlier allied General Sejusa wrote a letter to the press from London claiming he had evidence that there are plans to groom Museveni's son Muhoozi into taking over his father's position when the day comes that Museveni feels like retiring; a plan that soon came to be known as "the Muhoozi project". The plan allegedly involved the assassination of high ranked officers and politicians that could oppose the project. The Muhoozi project got so much attention in Uganda's political debate that the regime found it wise to close down all main independent media. For eleven days the New Vision, which is the president's "own" newspaper was the only news source. The organization for journalists in Uganda has also expressed concern for the freedom of press, after the NRM dominated parliament started drafting a law proposal which will make it illegal for journalists to bring electrical equipment like recorders and cameras into parliament (Muga & Zachariasen 9.2013).

At the same time skewed distribution of wealth and power has created a huge equity gap in the country. After 28 years in power almost one out of four still live under UN's poverty line, while at the same time enormous mansions shoot up on the top of Kampala's hills (CIA 2009). This however cannot all be blamed on Museveni alone. The lack of capital as well as structural adjustments imposed by development banks limited the ability for the government to provide social services. The development banks' commands of restructuring public sector through massive retrenchments as well as privatization from the 1980's and onwards came at a high social prize (Bastian & Luckham 2003 : 8). This has played a negative role on issues of democracy among other reasons because it

has made it even harder for the workers' unions to gain a powerful voice (Harris et.al 2004 : 184). Museveni bought a lot of goodwill and financial aid by doing what the donors said was right during this period.

In the neopatrimonial system we see in Uganda, as well as in several other African countries like Gabon, Angola and Equatorial Guinea, and Malawi (at least before the death of Bingu wa Mutharika), the governance model follows a different logic than the one we find in substantial democracies. The state apparatus that are supposed to foster democracy are altered by the "big man syndrome" where everybody has to answer only to the big boss. Therefore, we use the term neopatrimonialism, from Weber's expression patrimonialism about the feudal society in 17<sup>th</sup> century Europe (Cammack et. al. 2007 : 3). In the neopatrimonial state, the goals of the democratic institutions are to maintain the power structure. They are used to keep the big man on top. This creates a very dysfunctional public sector, where corruption has small or no consequences as long as the servants keep their loyalty towards their leader (Cammack 2007 : 602). We saw a very good example of that in Uganda during the scandal late in 2012, when around 13 million USD disappeared from the Prime minister's office with no consequences for the Prime minister or any of his closest staff (Piccio 10.12.2012). Following the debate in Ugandan newspapers up close, I got surprised to see how fast the parliament turned the public debate away from the fraud by bringing up the seemingly never ending populist discussion about what to do with LGBT-people.

Museveni has in several cases showed lack of will to prosecute even the clearest cases of high ranked corruption involving his supporters and close circle; even being quoted saying: "I will not run away from old friends" (Human Rights Watch 2013: 16). According to Human Rights Watch (HRW), the 45 million USD that was diverted from GAVI in 2006 by top officials in ministry of health, and the 12 million USD from the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria that disappeared from the same ministry in 2005, as well as several other

cases have in common that none of the perpetrators faced any consequences, even though it was clear who was behind it (HRW 2013: 18). HRW concluded in their 2013 report that the president seems to “let the big fish swim”, by failing to prosecute high-level corruption.

During my fieldwork in Uganda, I was several times told the following joke making fun of the leading politicians in the country, and their corrupt habits: A road is to be built. The minister in charge of having it realized first goes to the Americans; they offer to build the road for two million dollars. Then he goes to the Chinese; they offer to get the job done for one million dollars. At last the minister goes to a Ugandan contractor he knows. He offers to do the job for three million dollars. When the politician asks why the stiff price? The contractor says: One million for me, one million for you and one million to the Chinese. The last contractor wins the bid.

One of the other defining characteristics of neopatrimonialism is the lack of divide between private and public (Cammarc 2007 : 3). This gives the president the ability to do purchases which according to his critics seem overly extravagant.

*“In my view, the Ugandan government has already reached its limit in misallocating donor funds. The corrupt elite are enjoying money meant for aid. Our president can afford the luxury of 2 private jets, the best in the world for a sum equal to the total amount the country receives in donor funds. The people for whom these funds are meant for do not get it. So why is Norway, a very democratic country, an advocate for transparency and human rights and justice, supporting a clearly corrupt regime? It is very hypocritical!!!” (Interviewee 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. (Written interview.) )*

In 2009, President Museveni bought a top notch private jet for 88,2 billion Uganda shillings, shocking the opposition and many donor countries that claimed that the country had more important things to use money on; many quoting the young Museveni, who often was heard criticizing African leaders that used

private jets to get around. He is once supposed to have said: “The honourable Excellency who is going to the United Nations in executive jets, but has a population at home of 90% walking barefoot, is nothing but a pathetic spectacle” (Rice 20.12.2007). The same type of accusations were made as late as October 2012, when president Museveni acquired two new Mercedes Benzes for 2,3 million dollars (Africa Review 12.11.2012).

After analyzing Museveni’s 28 years in power, it seems even clearer that the belief some decades ago that by implementing institutions like elections and pumping in donor aid, substantial democracy would organically occur. The procedural democracies that emerge by means of clientelism and elite crafting can in the worst cases do more harm than good, because they give the elite the chance to withhold their positions. When the elites are elected by democratic institutions, no matter how unfair the election is, the same institutions legitimate their domination over the other classes. Uganda has all the institutions that are associated with democracy. However, it still doesn’t seem to include democratic ideals like popular participation and transparency. These are values that are intrinsically included in a substantial democracy and necessary to build popular control on the basis of political equality (Törnquist 2013 : 3). It was quite clear that my Ugandan interviewees regarded democratic institutions such as elections and the court of justice as little more than instruments for Museveni to take decisions which have the appearance of being democratic. Museveni is not regarded as a representative of the dominating party NRM. NRM represents Museveni’s interests. Anyone who dares to challenge what is decided on the top in the neopatrimonial structure gets to feel the consequences. Like one of my interviewees told me:

*“Even in the case where the 4 parliamentarians have been thrown out of parliament... They came to parliament under NRM. They were against presidential term extensions. They went against their party and they were thrown out...But according to the speaker of parliament - she said even if they came on N.R.M party, they were elected by their people to represent them( their constituencies) not NRM. So, NRM goes to court with the will that these people should be thrown out of parliament. They go to parliament and – and - Imagine that the judges are NRM supporters. They are members of the party. The MPs said that this was not fair. And one of the judges replies; The court case had already been ruled. You are dismissed from parliament” (Interviewee 7: Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)*



## 7. THE PARADOX OF PLENTY.

*“The strong association between oil and persistent poverty (is) often referred to as the resource curse; the curse has been haunting many, if not most of the oil producing countries in Africa, Latin America and the former Soviet Union.” (Bridge & Le Billon 2013 : 26)*

During my conversation with Ugandans and while I was reading articles about the impending Ugandan petroleum industry, I got the understanding that hopes were surprisingly low when it comes to what the people expects the revenues to do for regular Ugandans. In fact many talked about a fear for a forthcoming resource curse:

*“I foresee the few corrupt ruling elite and their relatives together with Tullow oil and the other oil drilling companies looting all or most of the oil money while the average Ugandan sinks into a dudgeon of poverty. I foresee the gap between the rich (ruling elite) and the common man growing bigger and bigger. Unfortunately the idea of the oil curse attacking Uganda is very real to/for me.”*  
(Interviewee 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. Written interview.)

“The resource curse” has become a term often used about cases where large natural resources have become obstacles for inclusive development. Despite of what classic liberal trade theories would assume, we see that the availability of large natural resources most often offers no comparative advantage for developing countries. Instead it hinders poor countries’ opportunities for economic and social transformation, and not uncommonly fuel violent conflicts, ignite authoritarianism and result in serious environmental degradation.

The area surrounding the Niger delta in Nigeria can serve as a typical example of this phenomenon. Thousands of people have gotten their livelihoods destroyed as a result of the environmental and social problems which have appeared as a result of the oil and gas activities in and close to the densely populated river delta (Jike,

2004 : 688). Resurgence of rebel and terror activities and several large destructive oil spills have occurred as direct results of the alienation local communities have felt from the large oil production units around them. Inhabitants of the region see oil pumps and pipelines sending great wealth out of their regions without experiencing that it in any ways benefits the communities and people affected by them. The answer to this by local population is extensive “oil piracy”, by tapping into oil pipes and making amateur refineries. Many inhabitants of the Niger delta have managed to earn some money from the natural resources that feel rightfully theirs. This however, results in terrible environmental degradation. Sabotage and vandalism of oil infrastructure has been another way to react to this alienation. Something which has resulted in huge oil spills (Ross 2012 : 172).

In conversation with a minister from the Bunyoro Kingdom, I was told that if a similar scenario happens in Bunyoro and the Banyoro don't benefit fairly from the resources that are being extracted from their lands, “people will blow up the pipelines” (Interview 6, Minister of the Bunyoro Kingdom). By that time I thought it was an expression, but after getting more acquainted with Banyoro history, I realized that this is a realistic threat. Banyoro have despite of their Bantu background, had a long history of both rivaling with and being suppressed by the majority tribe in Central Uganda (Baganda). The Bunyoro Kingdom is geographically located in Western Uganda and is one of Africa's most culturally rich Kingdoms, renowned for the great warrior king and hero Omukama Kabalega who was able to resist the British colonialists for close to a decade at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century. It was only when the British were assisted by Buganda forces that Bunyoro fell and Kabalega had to go in exile, which resulted in Bunyoro's lost counties.

Bunyoro is one of the regions of Uganda that will be experiencing most activity due to their large oil reserves. The way the oil and gas activities are managed here will be of the greatest importance to the Banyoro themselves, whom from a



human rights perspective are “entitled to protection of their culture and lands as well as to a fair share of the income” (Interview 6, A minister of the Bunyoro Kingdom).

From an environmental perspective, the oil activities in the Bunyoro kingdom are also of global concern since the kingdom extends to parts of the river Nile and the Murchison falls national park with its unique biodiversity. The River Nile is the longest river in the world and important for the livelihoods of millions of people as it runs through Uganda, South Sudan, North Sudan and Egypt. We can only imagine the horrible consequences large spills of oil or toxic drilling water would have in such an important area, for the biodiversity, but also for anyone depending on the river for income and livelihoods. The owner of a safari company operating in the area expressed her worries about the situation in this way:

*... every time I have clients there. They have felt like “what is happening?” People ask “what is that?” The roads are always closed with signs like “No way here” People are always wondering. There is so much activity. There are so many cars crossing the parks for the workers that are crossing from one station to another. (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

On my own field trip to the area, I could also see how elephants, giraffes, lions and antelopes within the national park already were competing for space with oil installations and heavy traffic created by machinery related to the industry, as well as with heavily armed military troops deployed for guarding the oil installations. This was what I observed inside Murchison falls national park, Uganda’s most important area when it comes to tourism related income. The importance of the annual income generated from this park cannot be downplayed when one takes into consideration that tourism is Uganda’s second biggest source of income. Very few tourists go to Uganda to see Kampala or any other of its cities; they come to see its unique biodiversity. The income generated by tourism

in an area like Murchison Falls national park can be sustained far into the future as long as the safety situation continues to be stable, and nature is allowed to take its course without having to compete with too much human intervention.

Many countries have had high hopes about transforming their oil resources into wealth and development, but such aspirations often fall short. Several factors seem to be decisive on the result of such processes. Bridge and Le Billon and other theoreticians list up the need for a robust and accountable government as well as a diversified economy as crucial factors for being able to transfer oil-wealth into sustainable development (Bridge & Le Billon 2013 : 125). Many of the countries that have dreamt about creating growth and development this way have failed and instead ended up with the resource curse. DRC, Libya, Angola, Nigeria, Equatorial Guinea and (South and North) Sudan are just some examples from the African continent. These are all countries that have failed in their varying efforts to create sustainable inclusive development on the basis of high natural resource revenues. Similar stories are found all around the world. Among experts on “the paradox of plenty” different theories are used to explain the resource curse, the most common explanation on whether resource management succeeds or not comes back to a nation`s form of governance.

Uganda`s current governance and political structures can therefore offer good indications on what to expect from Uganda`s “oil adventure”. Identifying Uganda`s governance issues therefore became an important strategy to find out whether the fears of a resource curse were grounded in reason, or if the Ugandan oil ministry`s hopes of fast tracking the economic and social transformation as a result of the petroleum deposits is a likely outcome.

*“Paradoxically, it is now almost conventional wisdom that resources are a curse for currently developing countries.”*  
(Robinson et al. 2006 : 448)

Development theory in general, all the way back from the classic theories from the industrial revolution until late into the end of the modernisation theory in the

1960's emphasized the great benefit there is for countries' development potential to have large natural resources. In a Ricardian world view, abundance of valuable natural resources should be one of the greatest comparative advantages a country could have, and from a classic liberal view on resources deriving from Adam Smith, any market should be able to regulate itself as by the work of an invisible hand of capitalism (World Bank 2005 : 308). Also the classical Marxist theories saw natural resources as an opportunity for heavy industrialisation and exploitation, which after the revolution surely would foster inclusive development. However history has showed us that these theories often are dramatically wrong when it comes to resource management in developing countries.

Petroleum which adds up to about 90% of the world's mineral trade also creates the largest amount of problems in many of the countries that export it (Ross 2012 : 1). Many countries in the world have experienced that even though revenues from oil and gas or similar extractions are accelerating, the gross national income stays the same or even declines. The Icelandic researcher Thorvaldur Gylfason found out that the total GDP of the OPEC countries dropped by 1.3% average per year from 1965 to 1998. From 1980 to 2006 the GDP per capita fell by 6% in Venezuela, 85% in Iraq, and with 45 % in the African oil-country Gabon. (Robinson et al. 2006 : 448).

Despite of what classic political economists had believed, there have been too many cases that have indicated that abundance of valuable natural resources has a negative influence on most countries' economy, especially on those with developing economies. The markets in developing countries seem to have minimal ability to regulate themselves and sustain healthy economic growth in such conditions. Under political-economic "the winner takes it all" conditions, it is unfortunately not uncommon that competition takes on a violent form. Angola, Nigeria and Sudan have all been through decades of civil war (Ross 2012 : 1), political violence fuelled by petroleum generated income.

Abundance of resources also seems to make it harder to achieve social and democratic transformation. The more oil a region has the less chance it has for being democratic. The Middle East is maybe the most obvious example of this, a region which has had more oil and less democracy than any other region in the world. When the third wave of democracy hit the world between the 1970's and the 1990's, democratization and freedom reached countries in the whole world with the exception of the oil rich countries in the Middle East and the former Soviet Union (Ross 2012 : 63). Even though there are some few exceptions, democratic transformation has not been common in oil producing countries in the past four decades.

## 7.1 Political corruption.

There are several reasons for the resource curse. Many cases of the curse can be explained by revenues being stolen by corrupt officials or in other ways ending up only in the hands of private elites, who build huge mansions and buy Lamborghinis and privately launder the money by investing the revenues in businesses and real-estate abroad. This was also the biggest concern for my informants:

*“Bureaucracy is not a very bad thing, but in a corrupt government it is a loophole that allows money to disappear along the way. I think that it (the Ugandan bureaucracy) is incompetent, corrupt and not transparent and therefore not suited or should I say not ready to generate a substantial increase for the Ugandan economy. (Interviewee 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. Written interview.)*

In July 2012, Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, Vice President of Equatorial Guinea and son of President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo, got much media attention when the American and French governments both issued an arrest order for him on the basis of money laundering. American authorities seized his 35 million dollar house on the coast of California along with Michael Jackson

memorabilia worth 494.000 USD and luxury cars for millions of dollars, including a Ferrari worth 532.000 USD. Not long after French authorities seized and auctioned nine luxury cars for 2.8 million Euros (Huet 8.7.2013 ) after he had aroused suspicion in Paris with extravagant spending and then failed to meet up in court to explain how he could afford such a lavish lifestyle on a government salary. The French court seized the cars on the basis of "sufficient indications to believe that all the vehicles were acquired through the misappropriation of funds" (Samuel 9.7.2013) In 2010, an estimated 75% of the population in Equatorial Guinea lived on less than 700 \$ a year, while the average per capita income was almost \$35,000 in the small oil-producing country on the African continent's west coast. (Lawson-Remer & Greenstein 1.8.2012)

In the same way Angola, despite of its oil wealth has huge poverty problems, while at the same time according to IMF 32 billion USD was squandered away between 2007 and 2010 on expenditure that could not be accounted for (Heller in Appiah-Adu 2013 :91). Political corruption is a major problem in most Sub-Saharan African countries, and the prospect of being able to grab millions of dollars does not decrease the willingness of corrupt politicians to privately acquire funds that would otherwise go into the state treasury.

Political corruption can be conducted for private gain or for group enrichment (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :114). In countries with competing groups such as tribes or ethnical groups, corruption often occur as a means of holding on to power or taking power from the opposite groups. In any manner, political corruption is destructive for development in several ways. Inge Amundsen at Chr. Michelsen Institute *Development Studies and Human Rights* describes three ways in particular in which political corruption contributes to the resource curse. They may be summarized as follows:

1. First of all it interferes with the ideal of the free market. It obstructs competition and encourages monopoly. Assignments will often not go to the bidder with the greatest merits, or the best and most well planned

scheme. It will not even go to the bidder who promises to do the job for the lowest cost. The assignment will instead go to the preferred contractor who represents the “right” group or is in on the corruption.

2. Political distribution affects the redistribution of revenues. Money acquired by corruption is seldom used for development of the country. Instead it goes into consumption or investments meant at laundering money, often abroad. Investment in power preservation is also not beneficial for development.
3. Corruption undermines political institutions of power sharing. Political corruption increases autonomy as it usually builds on clientalist or patrimonial structures. It is also destructive as it decreases the people’s trust in the institutions.

(Amundsen 2012 : 5)

Political corruption is a huge problem in most of Africa’s resource based economies. In the continents biggest oil producers Nigeria and Angola, it has been a practice that the political elite have set up private consultancy firms or oil companies that on the paper are supposed to cooperate with the big oil companies, but which in the end have no technology or competence to actually contribute and in fact just drain money from the oil industry into “rent seeking” elites’ private economy (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :120).

There is clearly a need to focus more on institutional quality when researching the reason for resource curses. This includes quality of institutions that are established to control and secure good resource management. But overarching this, there is a need to focus on democratization and power sharing in the institutions, since it in the end is these institutions that should secure redistribution for the best of the constituency. There is little hope of achieving development without also achieving a certain degree of redistribution of wealth. Securing good institutions is what is in that sense crucial for whether oil revenues

are going to the productive economy or into the assets of the countries' elites (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :121), allowing them to gain even more wealth and power at the cost of the rest of the demos. The institutions aimed at securing extraction usually run well, since these are needed by all parts to gain on revenues. It is the institutions aimed at revenue sharing that are the biggest challenge in resource cursed countries, since they are unwanted by an elite that wants to keep as much wealth and power as possible for themselves (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :123).

## 7.2 The Dutch disease.

The Dutch disease is a phenomena that got its name after a situation that occurred in the Netherlands in the 1970's, at the same time as its gas industry was booming after the discovery of natural gas in the 1950' and 60's (Bridge & Le Billon 2013 : 143). Even though the industry was booming, rather surprisingly the country's overall economy went in a downwards spiral. The phenomenon has later reoccurred in several other countries that have experienced similar resource related booms (Sachs & Warner 2001 : 838).

What happened in Holland during this period, and later in the other resource rich countries was that by exporting a lot of gas and having a big resource based income, the Gylden, the Dutch currency at the time increased in value. As a result of this, it got cheaper for the Dutch to import goods from other countries. At the same time it got more expensive for other countries to import products from Holland. When the currency value rises, non-resource related businesses lose out on business while at the same time the resource based economy blossoms, selling a much needed natural resource on the international market for international compatible prices. Suddenly the resource based industry is practically the only national industry that can compete both on the international and on the domestic market, and hence the total economy in the country drops. In the worst cases of the Dutch disease, industry and agriculture in countries that are

restrained from protecting their own economy due to liberal trade deals through the World Bank, IMF or the World Trade Organization, might then even lose the ability to compete in their own market.

Another unfortunate side effect of the Dutch disease is that after the resource industry gets too dominant and it seems like that's the only business where one can earn money, a "brain drain" process takes place in other industries.

"Everyone" wants to work in the natural resource sector. This does of course also damage the level of ingenuity in other sectors as people lose their will to invest time and money in other businesses (Sætre 2010 : 15). At the same time skilled workers "run" from the other sectors to the profitable resource sector.

Sometimes the Dutch disease reduces total GDP income, while other times it just slows down growth in other income generating sectors like technology. In any way, it hinders economic growth (Gylfason 2000 : 2). Since it also tends to reduce investments in sectors like technology, education and agriculture, it gets hard to catch up when the resources are empty or if the prices should fall.

Additionally, oil industry does not have a very high trickle-down effect in itself, and it does not necessarily create much employment compared to the potential income it can give. If the revenues are not managed wisely, the income can therefore easily end up in very few hands.

### 7.3 White elephants.

In other cases of the resource curse, revenues are just invested badly, in futuristic architecture, in inflated public sectors and inefficient bureaucracy etc.

Oil revenues should not be viewed as a regular income, but rather as money in the bank (Sætre 2010 : 15). This is because of its temporary characteristics, one day the reservoirs are empty and revenues stop. This means one should spend the revenues carefully. However during a boom, the value for a politician of holding on to power or getting power increases, and to stay on top in a political system



during such economic conditions, one has to keep a certain level of popularity. To gain popularity in a country rich on oil or similar resources, one has to spend a lot of money. A new type of populism then occurs; petro-populism. People's expectations rise higher and higher, and they will vote for the politician who promises to spend most money.

To please their constituencies, politicians in resource economies often go ahead and start building up projects and schemes to stay popular and keep themselves and their parties in power. Big promises amount to huge expensive projects which come at very high cost, and are even more expensive to sustain and maintain in the future. However, one day the resources that paid for the splendour have run out. When there is nothing left, income stops coming. All that's left is huge expenses of maintaining and sustaining the big projects that were started up during the boom, but without the revenues these expenses become too high. As a result, many countries are worse off financially after they have used up their natural resources than before they found them. The problem is that there have been a lot of investments, but they have not been investments in output growth; investments that give any return. Politicians might instead prioritize other kinds of investments, as it earns them political popularity to promise what other politicians might not promise (Robinson & Torvik 2005 : 197). The expression white elephant originates from the ancient east, where it was a big honour to receive a holy white elephant as a gift. However an elephant eats a lot; and since the white elephants were holy they could not be put to work. In the end they ended up as a huge expense for the person who had been honoured to receive the big gift (Sætre 2009 : 83).

Another aspect of the white elephant problem can be that abundance of financial means seem to cause lower expectations of quality of economic policies, seemingly fostering the philosophy that if something isn't working as it should, one just needs to invest more money in it (Gylfason 2000 : 2). Nations which start perceiving natural capital as their most important asset at the same time

often seem to deprioritize investing in creating a reserve of human capital through good educational systems. This locks much human capital in low-skill intensive natural resource based labour. Natural resource abundance creates a sense of false security that tempts leaders to invest in sectors with little or no return. Gylfason's findings were that by 1997 the OPEC countries invested an average of 4% of their national budgets in education, while the average of the rest of the world invested 5% (Gylfason 2000 : 6).

At the same time these countries' citizens often seem to start taking education less seriously. Even in a country with as successful resource management as Norway, there is a lack of engineers and university graduates in the "hard sciences". Ph.D. positions at Norwegian universities are taken up by academicians from other countries, as it seems like Norwegian students don't do well enough nor have the interest to pursue them. 36% of Ph.D candidate positions at Norwegian educational institutions are assigned to foreigners (Mjaaland et al. 5.3.2014). Among many Norwegians, there seems to be a consensus that taking a higher education is not worth the years and hard work it takes. One can instead just start working and get a good enough salary without a higher education instead. At the same time, the country is lagging behind many other European countries with which it is natural to compare it to in international rankings of performances of students and educational institutions.

Even though this poses no immediate threat to Norway today, this might be a cause for concern for post-petroleum Norway.

## 7.4 Obstruction of political pluralism.

The value of staying on top politically in a country increases fast when valuable resources have been discovered, both for the individual politician/leader and for ruling parties which finally might get the economical scope of action needed to enable them to implement their politics/ideology.

In countries with poor accountability and low transparency, the value often rises for leaders and their closest circle as well because of the chance for political accumulation of wealth. As a result of this, organizations like “Publish What You Pay” are lobbying for more transparency from all actors in natural resource based industries. Transparency decreases the chance for corruption and increases the chance that people and companies get hired based on merit and not tribal or family background.

Since the value of holding on to power is so high in countries where transparency is low and resource income is high, this often starts to affect the choices their leaders take. Populist measures are often taken in order to satisfy the constituencies. This can be done by creating white elephants like earlier mentioned, authoritarianism or by measures like cutting taxes. Cutting taxes and financing public spending on the basis of revenues from oil or other natural resources can unquestionably make the public satisfied in the short run, but it also makes the government less accountable than it would have been otherwise, when it comes to how to spend public funds (Ross 2001 : 328). This can be a major setback in the process of fast tracking economic growth and social transformation. Undemocratic leaders have a significantly greater chance to keep the power if they are able to decrease taxes and expand public benefits, while dictators who have to increase taxes and cut public benefits face a statistically greater risk to be overthrown, as people want to pay lower taxes and have more benefits in comparison to what they pay (Ross 2012 : 67). In a neopatrimonial state with an oil economy, the leader might actually afford to keep taxes at a minimum; in that way he can also keep the support needed for continuation of his dictatorship.

It can also be a serious setback in the democratization often needed to achieve social transformation and inclusive growth. Authoritarian regimes do not in any sense seem to open up for more democratic transformation when natural resources create the opportunity for economic growth. In fact if anything, it

seems to be quite the opposite. Good examples of this are found when looking at some of Africa's biggest exporters of oil. President Mbasogo in Equatorial Guinea and José Eduardo dos Santos in Angola are also Africa's longest sitting leaders. They surpassed Gadhafi after he got overthrown in Libya, another big oil exporting country (Mhute 22.2.2011). Both Mbasogo and Eduardo dos Santos have been leaders of their respective countries since 1979. Both countries have been among the countries in sub-Saharan Africa with the highest export revenues of oil and gas. Still, in both countries the revenues have been shared very unequally and most of it has ended up in the hands of a few, creating huge income gaps. Economic and social transformation has hardly benefited most citizens despite of high resource revenues.

Equatorial Guinea is only ranked as number 136 on the Human Development Index (HDI) despite having the world's 58<sup>th</sup> highest GDP per capita. At 25.700 USD as average income per capita per year, the country has a higher per capita income than both Greece and Portugal (Central Intelligence Agency 13.3.2014). Angola is Sub Saharan Africa's second largest producer of oil (U.S. Energy Information Administration 5.2.2014), but despite of this it is still at number 148 on the HDI. Luanda is visibly booming with a sparkling new waterfront and a shiny skyline. But right behind the impressive new architecture, most of Angola's population lives on a few dollars a day, even though Luanda the last years has climbed up to becoming one of the most expensive cities in the world (Mercer 23.7.2013). The big picture in these countries is that elites get more and more affluent and more and more powerful while the average population maintains a high level of poverty and marginalization. Looking at statistical material, lack of political plurality seems to be one of the most important factors hindering the chance for oil resources to become a basis for equitable development which also correlate well with Thomas Carothers five factors that reduce the chance for a developing country to achieve transformation (Carothers 2007 : 24).

## 7.5 Petro-violence.

The availability of valuable natural resources, from salt to opium and petroleum has been the source of many violent conflicts throughout history. Oil and gas has been the reason for both war between countries and civil wars. When the availability of petroleum enriches international oil companies and national elites with almost unimaginable wealth while at the same time most locals are increasingly disempowered and impoverished and left with little more than polluted air, lands and water (Obi 2011 : 2); the preconditions for violent insurgency are rising.

Resurgence of violence has a big potential to start developing between competing groups and classes as feelings of marginalization grow. This can be explained in the light of a feeling of alienation among poor people in local communities who see large oil installations extracting valuable resources from their territory, without any revenues being left behind. This creates a feeling of being isolated from the production units and resources that people living on the land feel ownership of, which can make it easier for groups promoting terrorism and other forms of violence both to recruit young alienated men to willingly fight and die for a cause, and to gain more widespread acceptance and support among local people. These conflicts no matter how straight-forward they seem to look at first glance most often have got much deeper historical and socio- economic aspects.

Nigeria might be the most obvious example of this from the African continent, even though the North and South Sudan as well as Angola are just as relevant, and there is no doubt that the availability of valuable resources both motivates and has financed many of the atrocious acts of war in the DRC.

Nigeria has been heavily condemned for the mismanagement of the resources in the Niger delta. These have sparked off rebellion and violence that have impacted the whole country including the environmental conditions in the great river delta (Kashambuzi 2010 : 127). In Nigeria the elites together with the multinational oil

companies have managed to keep much of the revenues for themselves, while the ethnic minorities in the Niger Delta have been further marginalized in this distribution. This has created a collective will among many people in the Niger Delta to win back the control of their resources and the rent it generates. At the same time, it has created a will within the political elite to spare no measures to hold on to the prevailing system due to the significant income generated by it. Religion, identity, tribe and class struggle get intertwined in a conflict which at the bottom is motivated by alienation and ownership / lack of ownership of income generating production units. Militias are getting more support as people see that peaceful protests against the system and the petrol industry have no or little effect. In Nigeria, this has resulted in attacks on oil installations, kidnappings of foreign oil workers and other horrific acts of violence (Obi 2011 : 2).

Rebel activities in Uganda's oil producing neighbors South Sudan, and D.R.C. have resulted in a constant civil war like situation for decades. These are conflicts that have spilled over to the Ugandan side of the borders numerous times. The fear that a resource curse can amount to petro violence in the country are therefore not without reason.

## **8. TRANSFORMATIVE POLITICS IN A COMPARATIVE NORTH-SOUTH PERSPECTIVE.**

### **8.1 Resource Management And Petroleum Aid.**

By looking at the main theories of good and bad resource management, I identified the different phenomena which ever so often turn resources like hydrocarbons into a “curse” instead of a “blessing”. The question is therefore how to establish a framework for resource management that can foster inclusive economic growth and social transformation in Uganda.

We can see that some factors clearly count to the benefit for a country’s likelihood of being able to establish a successful system of resource management. The keywords in leading development theories on which factors substantiate beneficial structures for resource management are words such as good governance, transparency, accountability, participation and political pluralism.

The Government is largely responsible for the outcome of the resource management for several reasons. It is in control of establishing the legal framework regarding everything from environmental concerns to revenue management (Amundsen 2012 : 6), and it has to establish a strategy for both extraction and export. The government needs to take decisions like whether exporting crude oil is enough, or if it’s beneficial to build a refinery and export finished petroleum products. If the latter is decided, it also has to choose where to place the refinery and what to do with toxic waste material. The government is also responsible for negotiating about licencing of oil blocks both with oil companies and with the local population and has the duty of delegating how roles are assigned in relation to which authorities shall have the responsibility of ensuring that the actors follow the mandate their roles entail (Appiah-Adu 2013 :

81) Past events have shown us that this can prove to be a challenge in Uganda due to the neopatrimonial nature of its governance. Several of my interviewees expressed distrust in the government's abilities to build strong unbiased public institutions.

*... when you look at the political structures in institutions of environmental governance like in organizations like NEMA, UWA, and in the ministries that they belong to etc., the whole process of appointment of the board of NEMA or UWA is not democratic or on merit. It has been steered by patronage and appointments are not on merit, but because of some political favors here and there.*  
(Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)

Patronage or clientalism is a well-known way of crafting democratic institutions. It is well documented that this is a strategy widely used by President Museveni to secure support. The iconic picture from 2013 of the president handing out a plastic bag containing close to 100.000 USD to a young man representing a youth organization went all around the globe; many claiming that it was clear proof of the president buying support and not an act of charity (Muhumuza, 23.4.2013).<sup>4</sup> One thing that is certain is that 100.000 USD worth of cash in a poor country is not an invitation to transparency or accountability.

To transparently disclose accurate information is one of the most crucial factors of good governance; particularly important in relation to resource revenue management. This does not only entail publically revealing all decisions that the government takes, but it also includes disclosing the information that was at the basis of all such decisions (Heller in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 98). In addition to minimizing the risk of corruption and misappropriation of funds and misuse of positions, transparency in political processes enhances people's faith in the system, which is crucial for getting citizens who accept to contribute both

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<sup>4</sup> Illustration III, appendix.



through paying taxes and by participating in democratic processes (Torgler et al. 2007 : 26).

Transparency concerning hiring processes is also of utter importance for achieving an efficient and competitive oil and gas sector, even more so in countries where tribal or ethnic backgrounds have had a tendency to play a large part in hiring processes. Transparency around employment practices both in the administration and in distribution of licenses falls under the need of transparency. This can ensure that the right person with the best merits gets the job instead of someone's spouse, cousin or "tribe-mate". Oil revenues come with "rent seeking", transparency is of importance to ensure that "rent" doesn't get lost in the hands of corrupt elites. There ought to be complete openness about what the income from the resource export is used for. This is a very important way of minimizing the risk of corruption, rent seeking and mismanagement of funds. Movements like "Publish What You Pay" advocate for the well-reasoned idea that both governments and companies in the extractive business should publicize their income and expenditures to avoid corruption. This would increase trust among the constituencies. A government which denies its citizens the right to insight into these issues is in itself a cause for concern. Good governments don't have anything to hide, and should therefore not have any concerns about being totally open concerning the use of revenues. Contract transparency does also to a much larger extent pressure both governments and extraction companies into renegotiating bad deals made by government officials as a result of corruption or incompetence. (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :117.)

*“Oil wealth can have a number of negative impacts on the quality of governance in oil-producing countries. The first is its potential for enabling authoritarian forms of governance and foreign interference. Simply put, oil wealth provides rulers greater autonomy from civil society and exacerbates foreign commercial and strategic interests. A population may be better off materially under authoritarian rule and with foreign oil companies, compared to dysfunctional democracy or mismanaged national oil company. Yet, without transparency and accountability around oil revenues and budgetary expenditures, the risk is high that authoritarian rulers and foreign companies will abuse their positions.” (Bridge & Le Billion 2013 : 144.)*

However, transparency does not save a country if there is no accountability. A government has to be accountable for its actions to fulfil its duty of good governance. There are therefore evident links between accountability and transparency. For a government to be accountable, there must be a certain amount of transparency, and there is little point in transparency if it doesn't foster accountability. Transparency and accountability are both pillars in the same structure of governance, as the strategies enhance public confidence in the system and thereby are believed to increase useful participation in the democratic processes (Appiah-Adu 2013 : 81), hence they can foster a more substantial democracy.

Institutionalisation and democratization are therefore decisive factors to this curse. Countries like Norway and the UK were already well governed before they found oil, and have therefore been able to resist negative influence from rent seekers, while countries like Nigeria, Sierra Leone and Sudan were authoritarian and institutionally weak and have therefore ended up with a curse (Inge Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 110). Weak institutions are not able to administer the revenues such resources give in a way that benefit the country. Few resource rich countries have managed to translate their natural resources into social transformation. There are however examples of countries that have managed to do this with success. Great Britain, Canada, Norway and USA have

all got huge oil sectors, and have experienced very few negative effects as a result of that (Ross 2012 : 2).

When a government is establishing a system of oil and gas activities, there are two ways to regulate the petroleum sector; by law or by license. Norway and Britain are two examples of countries which regulate oil and gas activities by law, while most developing countries regulate the petroleum exploration by a license system (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :116). In general, a license system means that laws concerning environmental protection and other security issues, concession period, taxation, technology transfers etc. are decided individually with regard to the each contract, and not by an overarching legal framework. When oil and gas activities are regulated by a licence system the chance for corruption gets a lot bigger. Additionally the task of controlling that private oil companies comply with the rules gets harder when all oil companies relate to different rules since production sharing agreements often contain confidential information (Amundsen in Appiah-Adu 2013 :116). When transparency disappears or decreases, the risk that revenue to the state treasury gets lost in the hands of corrupt officials *increases*. Countries can benefit a lot from establishing strong legal frameworks concerning all eventualities, with the overarching goal of promoting accountability and transparency.

Norway seems to be the most frequently mentioned success story concerning resource management in the literature. Norway has created a quite unique legal framework which secures that the country so far has only been moderately affected by the Dutch disease and the other unbeneficial traits often connected with resource economies. Their strategy is often referred to as an exemplary case of resource management. Several factors are understood to be the very reason that Norway has managed to experience this resource blessing. The most commonly motioned explanations might be summarized as below.

Stephen K. Donyinah lists four factors that have enabled Norway's success which developing countries aiming at translating their own natural resources to

economic and social change should take note of. Developing a national expertise plus the high degree of integrity, openness and transparency that Norway has had as a foundation in all aspects governing its oil industry have been the keys to success (Donyinah in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 21).

Norway has nearly had a political consensus on matters of resource management ever since the resource was discovered towards the end of the 1960s. From the start of the extraction, there was an agreement to conduct a slow acceleration of extraction to be able to observe and adjust its influence on the economy (this policy was slowly lifted during the 1980's). There were clear demands from Norwegian politicians that foreign oil companies be invited to share knowledge with and teach Norwegians the techniques of drilling (Al-Kasim in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 264). Another unique feature of the Norwegian administration of the country's oil and gas activities was that it got split between three agencies. The ministry of oil and energy (earlier the ministry of industry) have the legislative roll, the petroleum directorate have got the regulative responsibility, and the state owned Oil Company Statoil got the commercial role. This separation has despite of a few adjustments been kept as the model for Norway's oil and gas resource management throughout the last three decades, and has come to be known as the Norwegian model (Al-Kasim in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 265).

A third particular aspect of Norwegian policy is that it has had a policy of diversifying the companies that get licensees for drilling and awarding licenses to license groups, so called joint ventures; as is the case for most licenses given to fields on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.

*” Once a production license is awarded, the licensees are required to enter into a joint operating agreement and an accounting agreement regulating the relationship between the partners.”*  
(Statoil annual report 2011)

This system has been very beneficial for Norway, as it creates positive competition and brings together different experts to make joint decisions, based

on different interpretations of data. This strategy has also resulted in the discovery of hydrocarbons (Al-Kasim in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 266).

Norway is often praised for its oil fund, which has been a very strong asset in keeping the country's economy stable, like a vaccine against the worst effects of the Dutch disease. Revenues from the Norwegian petroleum export are immediately converted into foreign currency and placed in the fund. The fund is managed by professionals and is today one of the world's largest investment funds. Investments are done both in Norway and abroad in order to secure good risk management (Appiah-Adu 2013 : 82). Politicians cannot access money in the fund without the passing of a resolution allowing it in the parliament, and yearly spending should not exceed more than 4 percent of the fund, which is the expected average return of capital (Norwegian Ministry of Finance 07.05.2013). Currently, the fund is called the pension fund, and is supposed to secure retirement pension in the future as more and more people reach retirement age.

## 8.2 Transformative politics and the potential of Norwegian petroleum aid.

“The idea behind this development cooperation is - because Norway has unique expertise in the development of oil, and taking care of natural resources. - One has to think, how it is Norway can make a difference - where it is Norway has unique knowledge? There are many countries that can train them up in education or health care or. But to take care of an oil resource, that is one thing that Norway has been good at, and there are few examples of countries that have managed it better than Norway. And that's idea then - Yes, if Norway can share some of this experience and knowledge with other countries with oil resources. Then the economic impact of the oil industry far surpasses *that of* other development aid.” (Interviewee 2: Norwegian working for Oil for Development in Uganda.)

Sharing experiences from this success with developing countries so that these also are able to avoid the resource curse and instead can translate their oil and gas

resources into welfare (Norad 29.1.13) is the rationale for Norway to spend millions of Norwegian kroner per year on petroleum aid through Norad's development scheme Oil for Development.

Much can be said about the high tempo Norwegian politicians today have decided to extract fossil fuels on the Norwegian continental shelf in an age when the rest of the world's population are concerned about the imminent threat of man-made global warming. This goes well for another discussion and will not be dealt with in my thesis. Hopes of a greener future still don't undermine the fact that Norway is one among few countries in the world that have been able to create a framework which has secured that its oil and gas resources have been transformed into social welfare that benefits the country's demos; so far with minimal harm to the local environment due to a stringent legal framework that regulates how oil companies have to work to the smallest detail on issues of health, safety and environment (HSE). These strategies have undoubtedly been successful, and are now taught to the Ugandan regime. It is often claimed that the reason Norway at the moment is at the top of the human development index is because of its oil resources. This solution is however too simple. The reason Norway and Sweden both are among the countries topping UN's HDI is the process of transformative politics leading to the Scandinavian welfare model. The Norwegian resource management framework does not stand on its own and was not established by chance. The framework is a result of a particular take on capitalism often referred to as the Scandinavian model, an equality based transformative process where universal and "de-commodified" welfare schemes have been constructed to give all citizens social insurance (Esping-Andersen 1990 : 236).

It has been claimed that Norway's transformation was a result of such unique preconditions that the case is incomparable with those of developing countries in the global south today. This is said among other reasons on the basis that the country had no aristocracy based on feudalism, and because there were close ties

between the state and the church that wasn't rich enough to take on the task of offering social security on its own (Törnquist 2013 : 101). These factors were unique for Norway, and simplified the transformative process profoundly. However, it is also true that the two countries, Norway and Sweden, also had very different preconditions on these matters, and despite of this the two countries ended up with pretty similar models of welfare regimes. Norway had been a part of the Swedish empire from 1814 until it got its independence in 1905. It had been a part of the Danish empire for several hundred years before that. As a result of this Sweden had a much stronger state administration, and the power there was much more centralized than it was in Norway. Norwegian power was much more diverse and localized (Chandhoke et al. 2012 : 17).

Uganda was a British protectorate and parts of it were a colony in the British Empire for close to 70 years until it gained its independence in the early 1960's. While Uganda's population consists of a large number of tribes and religious groups, it is often claimed that the reason Norway managed to transform was due to a homogenous population (Chandhoke et al. 2012 : 17). However, there is also reason to question how homogenous Norway in fact has been. In addition to class differences, Norway is a very long country with large diversity both from north to south, as well as from east to west. The diversity can be illustrated with the fact that there are three official languages in the country (Norwegian, New-Norwegian and Sami). There was also quite a large Finnish population living in several parts of the country who spoke their own language, in addition to four national minorities (Rom, Roma, Kvener, and Jews) and the indigenous Sami-population. There were also quite many people with foreign nationalities in the country following four centuries of being a colony.

Much like in Uganda today, 1920's Norway was a country with a large number of poor and unemployed, a relative large class of low-paid workers with limited rights, and an even bigger class of free small scale peasants on the countryside in addition to the bourgeoisie and factory-owners. The country was economically

divided with the rural poor as the most impoverished group, much like in many developing countries today; Uganda included. The average income gap between the poorest municipalities and the richest municipalities was one to eighteen (Moene & Wallerstein 2006 : 4). The aggressive capitalism and economic crisis in combination with widespread poverty have strong resemblance to the conditions in Uganda today.

There are obviously not nearly enough similarities between the development processes that led to Norway's transformation the last century, to transfer any full-scale socio-political model from Norway to developing countries in the global south (Stokke & Törnquist 2013 : 21) .Yet there are many lessons to be learned about social transformative politics when analyzing the Scandinavian model's emphasis on growth and welfare that was created on the basis of a citizen grounded democracy, which can be of importance for developing countries today. These factors become especially important to look at when assessing an aid scheme with the stated goal to aid countries develop on the basis of political-economic models of resource management that were built upon this foundation.

1920's Norway was a country with a significant number of poor people. During the same and the following decade, both Norway and Sweden experienced some of the world's highest levels of industrial conflicts. In 1931 the number of working days lost to strikes in Norway was more than triple of the total amount of working days lost in the 25 years from 1945 – 1970 (Moene & Wallerstein 2006 : 4). Scandinavian workers struggled and won collectively, this became especially important for the workers with low wages. (Stokke & Törnquist 2013 : 31). Strikes were led by the labor movement in Norway (and the rest of Scandinavia) much like in other places. What differentiated the Scandinavian experience from most of the other labor movements in the world (with a special relevance in developing countries today) was the high level of unity between different labor organizations. Workers unions stood side by side with common



demands, instead of just fighting for their own sectors. A result of this in the long run was professionalization of the work force and wage compression that especially benefited the low waged worker (Moene & Wallerstein 2006 : 10).

The broad union of industrial workers, independent peasants, the unemployed and other labor groups secured a broad support for reforms and strong bargaining power. A unified strike could literally put the whole country at a standstill. This did however not only create wage compression over time, but from a political economic standpoint the wage compression and the social democratic welfare regime that the movement achieved created good conditions for economic growth because it created a bigger domestic market (Moene & Wallerstein 2006 : 24).

When Johan Nygårdsvåll stepped in and took the lead as Prime minister of the first stable Labor party government in 1935, he could draw on a series of social policies both in theory and practice. Inspiration by Bernstein and Keynes' ideas about spending money to stimulate the economy were in a sense practiced both by the American New Deal politics introduced by Roosevelt, as well as in the communist planned economy practiced by Norway's large neighbor to the east in the Soviet Union. This was the basis on which the settlement of the industrial crises of the first part of the 30's was settled (Brandal et al. 2012 : 21). The farmers that had been so important for the collective bargaining were satisfied with subsidies to agriculture. Protective measures were introduced to secure income to farmers and at the same time secure national food security through agriculture and food production for the country. Even though the liberal market was embraced in general, protection prevailed for the agricultural sector and it still does today.

The liberal economic explanation for Norway's social democratic success today is its oil revenues. This is the ideology that makes some Ugandans and OfD optimistic about exploiting Ugandan oil-reservoirs. However when looking at the broader picture, there is reason to claim that the Norwegian success model is not

due to its high income based on oil-extraction, but rather a result of transformative politics. The successful resource management that made Norway able to avoid the resource curse was not only a result of technocratic strategies alone. The technocratic solutions were merely answers to a democratic ideology which was emphasizing equality and equal rights, it is very unlikely that such a system would ever have come in place or could work had it not been for the process of substantial democratization preceding it.

### 8.3 Barriers and potentials for democratic transformation in the Global South.

Looking at “resource cursed” countries like Angola and Equatorial Guinea, we see that the lack of substantial democratization has been the main reason that the majority of the people still live in poverty despite of enormous wealth due to large petroleum reservoirs. Uganda has a constitutional democracy where presidential elections are held every five years. But does this make the country into a “real” democracy? The aim of a democracy is popular control over public affairs (Törnquist 2013 : 1).

Uganda is not the only country that progressed during the third wave of democracy but currently faces stagnation in the process towards substantial democratization as a result of neopatrimonial structures. Bastian and Luckham’s “Can Democracy be Designed” (2003) analyzed the shaping of political institutions and compared among other examples South Africa and Uganda because of their similar transitions. However, what seemed to be big steps towards substantial democratization ended up as a result of elite-crafting in the two countries; not particularly meaningful for the poor and voiceless part of the constituencies. NRM in Uganda is still by far the dominating party in the political landscape like it has been throughout the last 28 years; much like Jacob Zuma’s ANC in South Africa. Gray-zone democratic systems crafted by NRM and ANC have made it almost impossible for the elite to loose elections and

power. Both movements have been able to use the absolute trust given to them by the people through these systems to increase corruption at all levels, and the party elites have gained large amounts of wealth through political accumulation of capital and corruption. Finally, both the NRM and ANC have lost much credibility in most of the world, after being the “favorites” among donor countries during the 1990’s. Both the organizations have given new life to Machiavelli’s old saying about the corrupting abilities of power.

If the death of the great Nelson Mandela with time can weaken ANC, which in no way has been able to fill his shoes, South Africa might still have a good chance of creating substantial political transformation due to its well organized workers unions. Unions have commonly been important in establishing a path towards more substantial democratization and as a result, more equitable societies. Unions can be mediators that can represent the demos in public affairs; thereby being an important factor on the road to democratization and equity. In the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century in Scandinavia, unions were an important factor in creating the equitable social-democratic systems we see today (Bull 2007 : 85) as explained in the last section.

A more modern example from the “global South” of the potential of workers unions for forming more substantial democratization is the success story of participatory budgeting in Porto Alegre in Brazil.

When we realize that the institutions we thought automatically would create political representation on the basis of equality do not work like they were supposed to, it is crucial to find new ways of representation. In Porto Alegre oligarchic elite crafting of democratic institutions had been sustained through patronage and populism, but was overcome by implementing a new way of practicing popular representation.

Brazil was a military dictatorship from the 60’s to the 80’s. But because of international changes, they had to allow reforms eventually. This allowed the Partido dos Trabalhadores (the workers party) to be formed in the 1980s. Just

like the labor movement in Scandinavia, this was going to play a major role in social reforms for poor people during the following decades. This movement, like the one in Scandinavia also consisted of a unity of a wide range of different groups from the demos.

The party included academicians and civil servants (Gret 2005 : 10) with support from classical communists from the far left wing. The movement also drew in Christian activists gathering inspiration from liberation theology; a Christian ideology particularly important in Latin America. Mass strikes were organized by among others Luis Inacio “Lula” da Silva. Massive pressure as a result of the large and broad unions of protestors in the end led to political change. The workers party was then able to introduce the much celebrated scheme of Participatory Budgeting (PB). PB allows all the parts of the population to partake in the exercise of power directly. Poor people who used to experience powerlessness and voicelessness could all of a suddenly join public meetings and play a part in important decisions by direct voting and by being elected leaders in local councils. Representation is an important factor of democracy in a maximal definition. PB transformed clientalism into participation. The scheme has proved to foster empowerment in a number of different ways and has even resulted in positive behavioral change among people with traditional low socio economic status, which has allowed them to further improve their situations (Heller in Stokke & Törnquist 2013 : 57). PB has been able to transform settings where democratic institutions were used merely as procedural tools to legitimate clientelism.

Substantial democratization “calls for improved institutional nodes and clear democratic principles of representation that ensure strong linkages between popular organizations and institutions of public governance” (Stokke & Törnquist 2013: 6). In Uganda’s present power structures however, the workers have little or no chance to create strong and broad unions that can be a force leading to political transformation like the ones that were so important in

Scandinavia and Porto Alegre. Workers unions are systematically being repressed and marginalized (Beckman 2004 :171). The general response from President Museveni to worker unions has been “Do not disturb my investors” (Beckman 2004 :148). Uganda is a country where all kinds of activism that can challenge the hegemonic power of the president and his NRM are violently repressed. During the 2011 walk to work campaign, special forces and military police were used to stop people from leaving their cars at home and walking to work as a protest against government plans to buy fighter jets for 750 million USD and spending 1.3 million dollars on Museveni’s swearing in ceremony in a time where food and petrol prices had gone up so much that many Ugandans had difficulty making ends meet. At least 10 peaceful activists were shot dead by security forces during the protests, while opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye was brutally arrested several times (Freedomhouse 2013). The same Besigye repeatedly got arrested during my fieldwork in Kampala, and I could hear the tear gas canisters exploding every time he had managed to sneak past the police that constantly guard his home to prevent him from coming to town to “create chaos”.

*“No one can disorganize the country. Besigye tried to disorganize Kampala, the capital city. We tear-gassed him until he cooled off. He doesn’t need bullets. Just teargas is enough for him.”* (President Museveni, speech at heroes day celebration. Source Wesonga & Wandera 10.6.2013)

Regularly, also other prominent voices from outside the hegemonic NRM discourse get to feel the power of the authoritarian police force, when not complying with the leading discourse. Most noticeable during my fieldwork in Kampala were the arrests of Kampala’s Mayor Erias Lukwago.<sup>5</sup> The Mayor was repeatedly arrested, sparking up protests as usual followed by a hail storm of teargas canisters. Because of the Baganda majority in central Uganda the Lord

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<sup>5</sup> Illustration IV, appendix.

Major seat was won by Lukwago from DP. The people of Buganda traditionally opt for DP. This lack of total power however seems to have been solved by the president by establishing the position, Executive Director of Kampala Capital City Authority, that has been given many of the responsibilities that used to go through the Lord Mayor. The position which answers only to the president through the NRM dominated parliament was given to Jennifer Musisi. When the Lord Mayor was arrested and suspended for “incompetence” during my field trip, Musisi took over all his main responsibilities, while the position of mayor seems to have been made more symbolic.

*“The leader treats the country as if it were his little family in which he is the only decision maker.”* (Interviewee 7: Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)

The juridical framework regulating the oil extraction in the country, popularly called the “oil-bill”, has been created in a quite un-transparent way. Deals with oil companies regarding economic issues and concerning the rich biodiversity in the Albertine rift valley have been dealt with away from the public eye (Global Witness.org : 9.1.2014). When at last parts of the bill got published, opposition members also got arrested when criticizing the fact that the oil minister is free to single handedly make decisions regarding concisions on oil-blocks. Member of Parliament, Theodore Ssekikubo was jailed on the basis of stirring up social unrest when complaining about this (Oilinuganda.org 8.1.2013). The retired Bishop Zac Niringiye and several other supporters of the anti-corruption campaign “Black Mondays” have also had to face jail time for being outspoken without complying with the hegemonic discourse. The campaign “Black Mondays” is aimed at drawing attention to the corruption level in the country by wearing black clothes on Mondays; something which has led to many arrests (Otago 5.2.2013, Oketch: 12.2.2013).

The goal of such harsh treatment against activism may be successful in order to keep popular participation low, and by that securing continuation of the

prevailing power structures. But by repressing people's capacity to mobilize and influence politics, the elites are not only hindering Uganda from becoming a substantial democracy, but also hindering the country's development. Museveni has to "abdicate" sooner or later, in one way or the other. If people have been denied transparency and the right to participate for a generation, the next regime might end up sending the country through a downward spiral (Bastian & Luckham 2003 : 7).

One person I spoke with during my fieldwork told me that if by any chance Museveni died, he would drop everything in his hand and rush back from work to his family and lock his gates, because Museveni has made the whole country so reliant on him that it would be impossible to know what would happen.

In Uganda, the "top-down approach" designed to prevent ethnic competition has instead become a technique for the central government to hold on to control (Bastian & Luckham 2003 : 311); a tool used to keep the nepotistic elite in power. President Museveni has, through his dominance of the public discourse, thanks to large economic resources and much more access to media than anyone else, been able to build symbolic capital for himself and the NRM which is impossible to compete with for any other political agents in the country. National Resistance Movement Liberation Day which is a public holiday celebrated every year with parades and speeches celebrating the day Museveni got into power is a good example of how this symbolic capital is built. In the country with the world's youngest population, Museveni is not only a leader representing a political party. To the majority of the population, of which 78 % is under 30 (Ministry of Finance, Planning and Economic Development: 2013), the president has come to symbolize the country, as he is the only leader they have ever known. To the ones that are older than that, Museveni symbolizes the one who liberated them from the terror-regimes of Amin and Obote II.

By building this kind of capital, the leader has been able to construct legitimacy as the only person that can get Uganda on the right track, by using the strategy of

painting a picture of himself as what Dan Banik describes as “the savior” for the country (Banik 2010 : 114), as demonstrated by the quote below.

*We were struggling for liberation it took more than 20 years. We are now struggling to build our country. And we decide, who can manage according to the assessment we make of our people.*

*(Yoweri Museveni’s reply to the question of why he should continue as the country’s leader after nearly 3 decades to “Talk to Jazeera” aired on Friday, February 18, 2011)*

Uganda might have the necessary institutions that are connected to democracy, but the demos lack several basic democratic and human rights. This makes Uganda a procedural democracy but certainly not a substantial democracy. A typical obstacle to achieving equitable development in procedural democracies is fragmentation of different interest groups. Uganda has never before been a liberal democracy. Before it became a part of the British Empire in the 1890’s, it had consisted of many small authoritarian kingdoms (Tvedt 2012: 229). During the years of British rule, ethnicity came to play an important role in the power structures in the country. The Ugandan academician Mahmood Mamdani claims that the legacy of colonial rule in Africa still creates dividing lines that block real democratization. The colonial rulers differentiated between the different ethnical groups in their colonies. Race and ethnicity became political identities.

This has created a tradition of power struggles between different groups all over the continent. An example is the Hutu – Tutsi rivalry in Rwanda and Burundi (Mamdani 2001 : 656-657). Parts of the legitimation by the Hutu-extremist for their atrocious acts during the genocide in 1994 was based on the racist Hamitic myth created by early Belgium colonizers to distinguish between the two ethnic groups in a divide and rule strategy. It claimed that Tutsis could not be “real” Africans because of their ability to rear cattle and dominate the Hutus. The colonialists claimed they instead were descendants of Ham, Noa’s son, who had gone up the Nile after the ark had stranded. The Hutu genocide discourse reused



the same myth in 1994 to “prove” that the Tutsis didn’t belong there (Hagtvet 2008 : 370).

The British Empire’s identity policy is in the view of Mamdani reflected in the “us-and-them” mentality that we see today between tribes and “races” in post-colonial African states. We can clearly see this when analyzing identity markers in Uganda. A large proportion of elite positions are being held by the president’s own group which might be partly as a result of these processes. The tradition of ethnical domination instead of collaboration seems to be reflected strongly in the present situation. When academics at Harvard University measured ethnic diversity by country, Uganda ended up on top of the list (Alesina et al 2002 : 26). This is a challenge as we have seen that tribe does play an important role in Ugandan politics, and has done so since Uganda was established. Thomas Carothers lists up a divided population as one of the factors that drastically reduces the chances for a country to transform (Carothers 2007 : 24) and instead of a common Ugandan identity; it seems like tribal affiliation gets to be the dominating identity marker for many. This affects both equity questions, issues of democratic representation, and development in general. It is hard to create a well working public sector in a system where people don’t get jobs on the basis of merit but instead on basis of tribal and family background.

Labor unions could offer a way to engage people and give a voice to popular interests that cross tribal and ethnical dividing lines, but then these have to represent a broad “union” of groups within the demos like we saw in Scandinavia and Porto Alegre where activists succeeded in making regular people bypass the problem of lack of popular representation through collective bargaining power. However the question remains, whether such models can be created only bottom-up on their own. Partidos Trabalhadores was one of the main reasons the participatory budgeting could come in place (Baiocchi & Heller in Törnquist et al. 2009 : 122 ). In the same way, various social democratic labor parties in

Scandinavia and elsewhere first had to get the chance to influence politics from top political positions in order to accomplish more equitable development.

## 9. GOVERNANCE, THE KEY TO SUCCESS.

### 9.1 Elite crafting of democracy.

Museveni came into power in the midst of what Samuel Huntington called the “third wave of democracy” in the optimistic 1990’s (Harris et al. 2004 : 3).

During the same period, Francis Fukuyama declared the end of history after seeing the fall of the Soviet Union as final proof that liberal democracy had been victorious over all other forms of governance (Törnquist 2013 : 5). The almost deterministic belief in a road from authoritarianism to democracy was widespread after 81 regimes from as far reaching as Latin-America through Africa, Asia, as well as in Europe took important steps towards democracy during the eighties and nineties (Harris et al. 2004 : 3). This strong belief in the democratization process in Sub Saharan Africa was reflected in president Bill Clinton’s optimistic remark about “the new generation of leaders in Africa” during his Africa trip in March 1998 (Rosenblum 2002 : 1) ; referring to Uganda’s Yoweri Museveni, Paul Kagame in Rwanda and Zenawi in Ethiopia. When these leaders still hold on to power one and a half decades later (Zenawi died in power in 2012), there are clear signs that the third wave of democracy is far from completed. This is not only a trait in East-Africa, but has become a characteristic for many if not most of the countries that took their first steps toward democracy during this period (Carothers 2004 : 171).

During my interviews it became clear that trust in the democratic processes was fading. As one interviewee said;

*We have a democratic process in place. This is a good democratic process. The problem is that it has been abused especially around election time. The election results are not consistent with the mood in the country. Not so much that the*

*result is not consistent but even the magnitude of the result. Because the mood in the country and from opinion polls suggests that the simple majority are in favour or have a positive attitude towards the current government. The simple majority is 52%-59%. But you find the current government have about 75% of the vote. It is not consistent. There is no way you can get a 20% jump without having some sinister moves in the background. I think that is the way in which it has been abused. The democracy itself is fine but the process has been twisted for the benefit of a few people that are able to manipulate the democratic process.*

*(Interviewee 4: Ugandan Economist in multi-national corporation)*

Many countries seem to have stagnated in democratic gray-zones on their way to becoming substantial democracies (Carothers 2004 : 171). This seems to happen despite of the implementation of democratic institutions in the same countries. Many of the neo-democracies don't stimulate real participation by the demos; instead the democratic process has been corrupted and crafted by the countries' elites, serving their interests only. By using democratic elections and privatization as political means, institutions that were constructed with the aim to promote political equality and representation by the demos are instead crafted with the aim to preserve the prevailing hegemonic power structures. Democratic institutions become tools for the elites to legitimate their power and dominance over the majority, and serve in that sense the wrong purpose. Since it gets increasingly difficult, in fact often impossible for the lower classes to have their voices heard, democracy loses its most important asset namely that of substantive popular representation.

When the "right" institutions, don't succeed in creating democracy in a maximal definition of the word, the same institutions are just maintaining and legitimating the same power structures over and over again. Two good examples of this are the current political situations in Uganda and South Africa; two countries in Sub-Saharan Africa that around the turn of the millennium were favorites among donors. Even though Uganda has been a democracy on paper ever since

Museveni allowed a multiparty system in 2005, and South Africa has been the same since ANC's victory in 1994, it is to a growing extent unfitting to use the term substantial democracy about any of them. In 2013, it seems unlikely that neither Museveni's NRM nor the ANC under Jacob Zuma can lose elections, no matter how many scandals of corruption and political accumulation of wealth the two regimes get involved in. At the same time the equity gaps in both countries are ever growing.

The nineties' belief in a nearly deterministic road from authoritarianism to substantial democracy through implementation of democratic institutions is gradually fading. Implementation of democratic institutions does not necessarily gradually turn authoritarian regimes into fully operational democracies where liberal values create opportunities for popular control of political matters. Through high economic, social and cultural capital, elites have learned how to "buy" people's votes. Not only through the use of regular corruption (although that is not uncommon either) but more often through patronage, use of populism, access to media time and other resources for campaigning unmatched by any opponents.

During my field trip, two men were arrested in Kampala for hanging up A3 posters of General David Sejusa, who from his exile in London had become one of the most outspoken critics of the regime after Kizza Besigye (Jeanne 19.5.2013). The men were arrested for unlawfully putting up political posters, which seemed ironic as Kampala is plastered with huge "vote Museveni" posters all year around.<sup>6</sup> Meanwhile the regime seemingly never thinks twice about using the brutal military police on the people if any protests occur, which occasionally result in loss of lives. The regime legitimates these authoritarian methods as the only way to maintain the peace established after the "bush war" in 1986;

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<sup>6</sup> Illustration V, appendix.

claiming that political liberties can come later. This rhetoric is in the spirit of Huntington's "politics of order".

With the elites advocating for themselves and their fellow elites' interests when making important decisions, their interests seldom correspond with the interests of common man. Thus, real democratic transition never happens. The demos never get their voices heard in public affairs despite of democratic institutions like elections every fourth or fifth year.

## 9.2 The Sequencing paradigm.

I have now presented the main problems of the transition paradigm. This type of critique has often been countered by a "sequencing argument" (Carothers 2007 : 12). Some political scientists advocate for elite crafting of democracy. They claim that a rapid transition to an inclusive democracy can be harmful and create chaos and in the worst case civil wars. The sequencing approach is a claim that democratization *should* happen in sequences. In this view, a democracy in the minimal definition of the word might be enough for the time being, just to stabilize a democracy. Mansfield and Snyder write that premature, out-of sequence democratization often is more difficult and more violent than it would otherwise be (Mansfield & Snyder 2007 : 7). Pointing at countries like Chile, Brazil, Korea and Taiwan, Mansfield and Snyder show how sequencing of democracy can facilitate more substantial democratization as opposite of countries like Iraq where implementation of democracy has fostered more war and social unrest.

The sequencing argument is closely related to Samuel Huntington's thesis about the need for a "politics of order". Like the sequencing argument, this theory claims that there has to be an established system of law and order before all people are permitted full participation in political processes. Huntington assumed that this would often be best enforced through authoritarian means of power,

including military force (Törnquist in Harris et al. 2004 : 204). This theory has been widely endorsed by several authoritarian regimes, and is closely related with the rhetoric of Museveni and NRM. A good example of this is the argumentation for the Public Order Management Bill (POMB), which was implemented during my field work, and more or less made public protests illegal (BBC 6.8.2013) by demanding that any time three or more people meet up to utter political opinions in public, they must first have the permission of the authoritarian police force, permission which can only be granted if the notice is given seven days in advance and the police find the protest suitable (POMB : 29.4.2011). While Human rights organizations like HRW and Amnesty International called on the Ugandan government to repeal the Public Order Management Bill and “stop restricting the basic rights of the Ugandan people to participate freely in political debates and discussions.” (Amnesty.org : 5.8.2013), the NRM dominated parliament apparently claimed that the law would safeguard public order (POMB : 29.4.2011).

The sequencing argument and politics of order can be said to be part of the same paradigm. The question that arises however in a context like Uganda, is how long should a regime be allowed to wait before implementing the next sequence before it has consequences for its partnership with recognized democratic donor countries? Uganda is now in its 28<sup>th</sup> year of “sequencing” democratization, and it seems more and more clear that the transformation has got “lost in transition”? (Sasse 2005). Carothers argues that it took two world wars and several hundred years to get the preconditions right for the development of more substantial democratization in Europe. Assuming that most poor people in the Global South don’t have the time to wait that long; the only way to give the demos a voice may be by bypassing the traditional forms of representation.

Political representation in countries which are suffering from elite crafted democracies will most often base their representation on one form or another of “politics of order” justified by symbolic representation (Törnquist 2013 : 15).

“Symbolic capital”, an expression deriving from Bourdieu’s different kinds of capitals, describes a way of legitimating one’s power through the political discourse by symbolical attributes like prestige, honour and reputation (Harris et al. 2004 : 16). Like when Museveni repeatedly portrays himself as the only one fit to rule Uganda, as a result of being the one who led the NRA in the bush war, and stabilized the country.

In such contexts, there is reason to argue that donor countries ought to be very careful when in any way partnering with the country’s government. Aid to a regime that has crafted the democratic institutions into structures that only work to hold them in power might easily work against the opposition, as it is used by the regime as symbolic capital. In fact such aid might counteract democratization, something which might mean that foreign aid to Uganda should be restructured. Like one of my informants said.

*“I think one of the ways is to stop budget support. When it comes to the energy and access to electricity and energy, Norway has done many projects like transmission lines that they have not branded as theirs. They should make it clear that this aid is coming from Norway. People think that it is the government that has done it, and government tends to own these projects.” (Interviewee 3b: Ugandan, human right lawyer. (Group interview))*

Looking at the political discourse, one also sees clear signs of this happening. It is not uncommon that the regime takes credit for donor funded projects. Many Ugandans I talked to were very critical towards the concept of foreign aid.

*“Museveni NEVER credits donors during his campaigns. He uses their funds to credit himself and has sometimes insulted them. And yes, this has slowed down the process towards a sustainable democracy and need I say economy.” (Interviewee 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. (Written interview.) )*

This raised an important question concerning the way Norwegian aid is distributed. If Ugandans themselves are critical towards receiving aid, and the



result of the aid is increased symbolic capital for an authoritarian leader with the main aim to hold on to power for as long as possible; there should probably be more public debate about the way the aid is distributed. However, very few Norwegians know about OfD, and even less about the deficits in Uganda's democratic structures. This raises the question of why these issues are not more openly discussed in the Norwegian Aid discourse.

The depoliticization of aid might be grounded on a good ideal of respecting other countries sovereignty by not getting involved in their political issues. However by being involved with neopatrimonial leaders without "getting involved" one does actually get involved. One can claim that Norway takes sides with authoritarian regimes when partnering up with them without being clear and outspoken about democracy issues and human rights abuse. One of my interviewees stated the following, suggesting that "Norwegian aid" is indifferent to democratization and human rights abuse.

*"Me.....what I would suggest is that.....for a country like Norway, it should set its rules. First of all there is no democracy here. Norway itself knows that. They have had reports. They have seen how police tortures us and our freedom." (Interviewee 7: Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)*

During my research, I attended the "the Nordic National Day Celebration" on 22<sup>nd</sup> of May 2013 in Kampala. I thought this would be a good chance for the Nordic countries to show their strong commitment to human rights and democratization. This was the very same day armed police closed down all main independent Newspapers and Radio-channels as a result of them publicizing alleged plans of assassination of leading politicians and generals opposing an alleged plan to groom Museveni's son to become Uganda's next president.

The Norwegian, Swedish and Icelandic and Danish ambassadors all held a joint speech of about half an hour. Even though human rights was mentioned, and it was said in a short sentence, "the Nordic countries support the freedom of

speech”, this was done in the most diplomatic way possible, with no mention of the dramatic events that had occurred earlier the same day. The main content of the speeches was about economic growth and the good cooperation between Uganda and the respective countries. By the time all four ambassadors proposed “a toast to the good health of his excellency Yoweri Museveni” everyone had forgotten the serious violation of the freedom of speech, and its subcategory the freedom of press that had occurred earlier the same day.

## 10. Development and environment.

*“The Global North has to abstain from attractive short term solutions of strengthening the comparative advantages of their own strategic sectors by benefitting from low-wage and environmentally destructive production and raw materials from the Global South.”*

*(Stokke & Törnquist 2013 : 310)*

Resource management following oil and gas activities cannot be thoroughly analysed on its own without looking at the environmental aspect of it. This is of even more importance in cases of onshore extraction, as this kind of extractive industry often is more directly interfering with common people's daily life and livelihoods. Democratization, environment and governance are intertwined subcategories in any successful oil management, and therefore all important parts of avoiding a resource curse.

In substantial democracies, different discourses concerning development and environment have their most important field of competition in regular elections, when competing candidates take on different discourses and compete about the people's recognition as representative of their interests. Representation is decided through popular votes. Each side usually presents a well formulated take on reality, and competes about winning the constituencies' votes. The winner then gets the chance to influence the political direction the following few years. Politicians have lost elections by not taking environmental concerns among the constituency seriously enough in substantial democracies. Sweden's great statesman Olof Palme experienced this when he and his Social-Democratic party surprisingly lost power in 1976 after advocating strongly for nuclear power.

However in procedural democracies with lack of political pluralism, where the leader can be sure of not losing elections, the environment seems to be a political issue.

*There has not been any real public debates engaging and educating the ordinary Ugandan on the subject of oil and development. The bill has not been shared and broken down to the ordinary man. Issues concerning Wildlife, environment and other areas that could be affected have not been thoroughly addressed". (Interviewee 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. (Written interview.) )*

Such democratic deficits can easily become very problematic in my case, as the majority of the population living in Albertine Graben are involved either in agriculture, fishery or in the tourism industry; all industries highly dependent on a healthy environment.

Agriculture and tourism are the two biggest sources of income for Uganda. Some of the most important lakes for catching tilapia and Nile perch are found in Albertine Graben. Fishermen have already complained that fish have been disappearing as a result of oil companies' seismic investigations; an allegation the oil companies have denied claiming decreasing catches are because of over fishing (Ssebuyira, 12.06.2011). No matter what the truth is, there is little doubt that any of the three livelihoods mentioned above will have a hard time surviving in a destroyed environment, and that petroleum industry has the potential of creating such devastation if it's not managed wisely. This has been demonstrated too well in Nigeria's Niger Delta.

The oil and gas activities in the Albertine Graben are directly competing with key interests in the valley which is world renowned for its natural splendor and huge variety of species. Like one of my interviewees expressed her concern;

*"Currently in Uganda, tourism was beginning to grow. And tourism is one of those sectors that have multiplier effects. Not only one person benefits from tourism. It creates many jobs and opportunities along the chain. From the people that surround the park to hotels etc. It creates more job opportunities for the local people and more people. With oil being found in Murchison falls National Park, they say there is a lot of money in oil. They will get it and then what happens after 20years? That is going to destroy the park." (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

*Even if the oil industry's claims is correct, and modern equipment for oil and gas extraction is so environmentally safe that it can coexist with wildlife, one can wonder how much industry like that can be constructed and exist in a wildlife sanctuary before tourists stop visiting. Like my interviewee expressed, tourists go to such parks not only to see animals.*

*“The feeling of being in a secluded wild, national park is not there. I think that for a traveler, I do not see them being excited to come back to that park. For the seasoned traveler; I do not see them coming back to that park. Hopefully, they would consider to come back to Uganda but maybe choose another park. But having Murchison falls as our largest park definitely affects tourism and definitely also having the River Nile running through the park is a big thing. “ (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

Most tourists go to such places to get the feeling that they have ventured into true wilderness, and a serene landscape untouched by human hands. It is valid to question how many drilling towers and truckloads of drilling waste that can coexist with tourism in such an area before tourists start picking other destinations. Seeing the animals of the African savannah grazing between oil installations and heavy industry is not the same experience.

## 10.1 The politics of sustainable development

The aspiration of industrial development and environmental protection often end up as conflicting interests. However, when the goal is to develop industry, agriculture and other employment or income generating businesses needed to counter poverty, some environmental sacrifices often have to be done. Harold Wilhite gives an example of this which he refers to as “the energy dilemma”. According to him, there is a need to drastically reduce the global use of energy in order to avoid an environmental crisis, but at the same time there is a need for increased energy for development (Wilhite in Bjørkdal & Nielsen 2012 : 81).

Looking at developing countries through dilemmas like this can be daunting; as all logic shows us, it is not sustainable if “the rest” of the world took up consumer patterns like in the OECD countries and of the local elites in many developing countries. The world can probably not even sustain the west’s overconsumption on its own in the long run.

The solution known as sustainable development; was a liberal theoretical approach to this problem, by establishing a theory about development that helps countries develop out of poverty without threatening existing consumer patterns. The good news from the neo-liberal mid-eighties was economic development without ruining the planet. In the ground-breaking UN-report “Our common future” from 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development also often referred to as the Brundtland Commission introduced the term sustainable development in the development discourse. The term had been used for some time from the 1970’s, but Brundtland’s definition “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the needs of future generations to meet their own needs” (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987 : 40), made sustainability into what Dan Banik calls one of the “buzz-words” in the development discourse (Banik 2010). First, it was celebrated for its ability to bring environment into development but later, the sustainable development mantra has been criticized for being too vague. It has also been criticized from environmentalists because it also was a growth oriented development strategy, environmentalists are increasingly claiming that it became a means to “green-wash” business as usual (Payne 2010 : 136). At the same time, the “sustainability” term seems to have gotten a life of its own, not only being used about development in relation to environmental concerns like it initially was meant to, but also in relation to anything from social and cultural structures to economic growth (McNeill 2000 : 16). This has made it harder for environmental concerns to “compete” with economic interests in cases where short term economic growth conflict with concerns of an ecological character.

By enquiring what the goal of sustainability in establishing industry means, we learn fast that the ways the goal of sustainability in development are interpreted and enforced are closely connected with power relations. This raises the question of which actors have the “power” to define what sustainability is, and on what basis? Today, an increasing number of academics claim that “sustainable development” answers to the development dilemma work only in theory.

When analysing the most important agents of popular representation and their form of popular representation, one can understand how the reality is constructed when it comes to sustainability. Power through language constitutes the “social accepted reality”. When researching the potential of forthcoming resource management in Uganda, it becomes important to try to understand on which basis decisions have been taken concerning environmental issues since what I have established as a neopatrimonial regime took over in 1986. In a neopatrimonial context, environmental politics and resource management are to a high degree shaped by the country’s lacking form of popular representation.

In Uganda the last decades, the Museveni regime has had a varying impact on environmental issues. Wildlife protection has in general been a lot better than it was before 1986. The population of several species in Uganda’s national parks has increased steadily during the last three decades. It is pleasing to know that the population of mountain gorillas has increased from 380 individuals in 2003 to 480 individuals in 2010 (Gray et al. 2013 : 236); which means there is now a total of about 880 specimens left of the world’s largest primate (Gray et al. 2013 : 268).

*“My view for democracy in Uganda now is both a good thing and a bad thing. I think, for a young country like Uganda, I would not care whether we are democratic or not, if the leader/leaders were making the right decisions. Where it has been good sometimes for some reason, the leader can be interested in something and that particular thing will be protected. That is where it is good. But then when they do not, in the same breath they can destroy it. For example in the case of the Gorillas in Bwindi impenetrable forest where the leader declared no more encroachment. They said they were going to protect Bwindi. They kicked out all the people who had encroached on the park. They said it was going to work and indeed it worked...” (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

During a debate in Norwegian newspaper “Morgenbladet” following Jørgen Randers book “2052 – A Global Forecast for the Next Forty Years” during the summer of 2012, a new word appeared. The word was environmental-pessimist (Norwegian: miljøpessimist) describing someone that has given up hope that an impending environmental catastrophe can be avoided through democratic means, and therefore believes that there is a need for having stronger leadership which can make unpopular decisions despite of what the constituencies might wish for when it comes to issues of environmental protection (Martiniussen, 12.7.2012 ). In Uganda when looking at the increase in wildlife population in national parks, it might seem like the environmental pessimists have a certain point.

*“...They did the same for L. Mburu National park. People had encroached on the park and they kicked them out... Recently people were making noise about Kidepo National park. They complained that the park was in the most fertile area, yet the rest of Karamoja is not fertile. I am sure he will not give it to them because they are not very many people in Karamoja and this does not affect his votes/voting. If he wants, he will give it to them and what can we do about it. We can only make noise and give up. So, sometimes when they make the right decision it is good but when they do not still you have no choice.” (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*



From a development point of view investing in national parks was a good investment. If any political doctrine can be pinned on Museveni the last decades, it must be the “developmental ideology”. In a developmental state, the first priority is economic growth as opposed to for instance welfare and wealth distribution (Payne 2010 : 102). This has resulted in impressive economic growth rates in Uganda. In Albertine Graben, this growth oriented quest has also so far been to an advantage for the wildlife until today; thanks to the prospect of foreign capital left behind by tourists.

The important question now, is what will happen with the protection of the Albertine Valley when the economic interests of today connected to its biodiversity start competing with substantial economic interests; oil revenues and not small scale farmers and poachers like it did before.

When talking with Ugandans about development and environment in relation to governance, one case is frequently mentioned; “the Mabira forest giveaway.”

*“A few years ago - I think 2009 - early 2010, Mabira forest was the subject of a huge riot. And there were cases of investors being given land right in the middle of the forest for agricultural activities. And it shows you that in terms of protection of natural resources for the benefit of the country; in that particular case the government failed because the government was actually supporting these investors.”*(Interviewee 7:Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)

Mabira forest, located only about 50 kilometres outside Kampala, is a 30.000 hectares tropical rainforest with a large number of trees-, birds- , and butterflies species. The forest is also home for a number of reptiles and small mammals, as well as an important water catchment area for Lake Victoria, and Lake Kyoga basin (Akaki 2011 : 24). As a rain forest it also “produces” rain for nearby crops and cleans the water from Lake Victoria and Kyoga. The rainforest can therefore be said to have a significant function for the environment in other surrounding areas. In 2007, Kampala was shook up by huge protests after plans of clearing

7100 hectares of forest and selling the land off to the Indian owned Metha Group for sugar cane production became public. Large numbers of Ugandans and different civil society organisation, including the strong Christian churches, united in what seemingly was huge environmental protests.

The case gives us interesting insight in the way the regime defines and constructs the discourse of sustainability in Uganda. President Museveni was one of the major proponents of, and one of the designers behind the plans to cut down the forest. Analysing parts of the letter he wrote in the regime run newspaper the New Vision gives us a good insight into his point of strategy in situations where economic interests collide with environmental protection.

*“I have been involved in these land allocations. Why? It is on the account of the urgent need for industrializing our backward but rich country in terms of natural resources and raw materials. Our backwardness is on account of the absence of industries... The problem of Africa is not lack of forests but lack of factories, hotels, real estate, professional services etc... Those 1,391 acres that Heathrow occupies would not earn the UK five billion pounds if they were still agricultural.” (Museveni 19.4.2007 )*

What we see when we read these sections is a firm belief that industrialisation and economic growth is worth more than the environment when the two are measured against each other. Furthermore it opens up a scope of action to exploit natural resources also when this comes at the cost of environmental and agricultural interests. This raises reasonable concern for the forthcoming oil and gas activities.

*“Do you see any links between democratization and environmental protection in the country?”*

*“Yes and very clearly. What I see is that our not transparent, corrupt government uses its power to suppress any environmental protection and impact assessment discussions.”* (Interview 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. (Written interview.) )

Looking at the way Museveni goes on to describe anyone opposing the plans of cutting down the rainforest further gives us an interesting insight into how symbolic representation is used to discredit both environmental activism and opposition in general.

*“...obstructing investors ... as the pro-enemy press is doing is, indeed, an enemy act - an act by those that do not want Uganda to transition from backwardness to modernity!”* (Museveni 19.4.2007)

Several things are interesting about this sentence. First of all, we notice that the only independent daily newspaper (Daily Monitor) is labelled by the president - not as opposition press, but as pro-enemy press. This reminds us about the difficulty of being in opposition in a neopatrimonial country. If someone doesn't pledge their unconditional support to the leader and his ideas, that someone is labelled as an enemy of the state. In this case, this also means environmental activists. Opposing to sell off valuable natural reserves to investors is characterised as an enemy act by someone who does not want Uganda to transition to modernity and does not want it to transition from “backwardness”. The president goes on to say:

*“Some opposition and their press are envious of our achievements. They are worried that if we implement what we have planned, they will be marginalized for ever.”* (Museveni 19.4.2007 )

When these accusations come from the absolute highest authority of the country, they pose serious consequences for people when taking a stand. In a country with such a strong system of clientalism, all high positions go through loyalty to the

regime, so challenging something the regime has set its mind on will therefore be out of the question to anyone with high ambitions.

However, the case of the “Mabira forest giveaway” also gives us interesting insight into the potential transformative processes in the country. Even though the protests had a tragic outcome as several people got killed, the protesters won and the plans of selling off the forest in the end were put on ice.

The only way to win through such a structure is by creating broad unions between different groups representing a big section of the society together with different civil society organization. This is what we saw in the success stories of transformative politics from Porto Alegre to Kerala as well as the path to substantial democratization in Scandinavia in the last century. The impressive thing about the case of the Mabira Forest giveaway was that such a movement occurred, and it grew in strength until the plans had to be stopped.

*“...like when they were going to give away Mabira forest, the politicians, civil organizations and the everyday Ugandan were saying no. No way! Not Mabira forest! We cannot allow this. And indeed, Mabira forest was not given away. I mean, we do not know how long that will last. But because of that unity the forest was saved. If civil organizations can get to the grassroots, and the local people understand what they are saying and there is that connection; then there will be more impact”. (Interviewee 7:Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)*

The way this environmental agenda seemed to have engaged so many people, to the extent that they managed to stop the plans of an otherwise very autocratic regime is very interesting and can prove that there is room for the transformative politics needed to secure a model of resource management that can result in more inclusive development. The Mabira forest protests were successful because they, just like the processes in Scandinavia, Porto Alegre and the HDI success story of Kerala, managed to unite a broad union from the demos; a union consisting of opposition politicians, the church, environmental activists, cultural traditionalists and common people.

However it is highly unlikely that we will see anything similar in relation to the environmental threats posed by oil and gas activities in one of the country's most valuable national parks. On questions of whether similar protests could occur as a result of environmental degradation in Albertine Graben, all my informants seemed to be quite convinced that this would not occur.

*"Mabira, like I said, was a countrywide outcry. All the people that had used that route and have been to eastern Uganda could relate to the feeling of driving through that forest; the fresh air, the shading etc. But if one is only sensitizing the people around Murchison falls, then persons in Kampala who have never been there do not feel that Murchison falls affects them." (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

My informants seem to doubt that similar protests could occur mostly because Mabira Forest is so close to Kampala while the National parks affected by the petroleum industry are quite "off road" and therefore not a concern for most Ugandans. The turn the country has taken towards a more authoritarian and militarized police-state was also mentioned as another reason.

*"...I think it could happen again (Protests like the Mabira-protests). But I do not think that the government would allow for it to happen. The thing with Mabira is that it was easily identifiable with. The national parks, not so much, mostly because they are a little way out of the way. They are a sort of nationally known national resource. People identify them with animals/ wildlife. They may not be too keen on wildlife... Whether or not this will happen again is a different issue. A lot of these riots happen in Kampala. Outside of Kampala there is not too much rioting that takes place. The government has stationed the police and military presence in particular areas so that if people start rioting the police and army are able to respond quickly. People may want to riot, but whether they will get a chance, I doubt it." (Interviewee 4: Ugandan Economist in Multi-national Corporation.)*

After I had studied the Mabira case more, I also realized that seeing such intensity in protests against oil and gas activities in Uganda's most precious national parks was not very likely because of another reason too; the fact that the

oil industry is not run by Indians. The Mabira Forest protest probably got more people involved as a result of Metha Group being an Indian owned company. Looking closer into the protests, I found out that at least two of the people who were killed during the protests were innocent Indians that accidentally got in the way of the agitated mob. These were hate crimes ignited by the prospect of environmental destruction, and the protest following it grew particularly strong because of ethnic hate towards a certain group.

*“...it was more than environmental - the people within Mabira forest are people who stay there and they cultivate on small pieces of land within the forest. We have the charcoal burning people. I think it was environmental but with other socio-economic issues. The people who live around/within the forest needed it to be protected too. They were earning a living from the activities within it. That is how they are sustaining their families. They also needed to save Mabira. Then also being biased. Why should an Indian come and take over the little of our natural thing. This was also part of it. It was not just environmental.”(Interviewee 7: Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)*

No one who lives in Uganda for a while can avoid seeing that ethnic Indians living in Uganda in general are wealthier than the average Ugandans. Many, if not most businesses of a certain size seem to be run by Indians. Neither can anyone who lives in Uganda for a while, and takes the time to speak with Ugandans and follow the public discourse, fail to acknowledge that there is certain resentment towards Ugandan-Indians. One often hears how badly individuals are treated by their Indian employers, when however the real problem is structural. In a place with high unemployment, including as many as 61,6 percent of youth not involved in school or steady work of any kind (Action Aid 2013 : 27), the labor market will be a “buyers’ market” if the right legal framework is not established to regulate the labor market. However, Museveni has been very dismissive of any suggestions of workers’ rights like the implementation of a minimal wage (Omollo & Gonza: 02.05.13).

There also seems to be a common feeling that it is easier for Indians to do business in Uganda than for ethnical Ugandans, and that they get better conditions than Ugandans while negotiating with the Ugandan government. The idea “Indians have stolen the whole country” is therefore widespread.

*“People took a stance against Indians at that time. There were some unfortunate incidents where some Indians were attacked whether on the road or in their shops because of the Mabira issue. I would not call it tribal as such, it was more nationalistic. It was all Ugandans within Kampala especially just rising up and saying that they were not going to take it. These people were from different tribes. Tribal would suggest that a particular tribe was being attacked. They identified some Indian people and attacked them and the crime that these people did was that they were Indian. They ended up taking all their frustration on Indians. One or two Indians unfortunately died in those protests.” (Interviewee 4: Ugandan Economist in Multi-national Corporation.)*

The hate towards the Indian population is not a new phenomenon. Idi Amin played on these feelings in a populist strategy in 1972, when he gave the Indian and Pakistani part of the population 90 days to leave the country; according to him because God had told him to do this in a dream. Following this expulsion, the Ugandan economy which had been quite decent until this point, crashed as the whole import chain crumbled while stores were looted. The people who were to take over the Indian businesses did not have the relevant experience or contacts to succeed (Nayenga 1979 : 130).

However, even though the Mabira Forest protests contained elements of nationalism, they should not be reduced as being all about ethnicity.

*“Did you experience the protests against "the Mabira forest giveaway" as environmental protests, or did they have other more important political ethnical or social implications?”*

*“That is an interesting question. It was a bit of everything. Some Ugandans were saying that they were going to fight to protect their environment while others saying that they were going to fight against the political establishment which is trying to abuse its power by giving away a natural resource that is supposed to be for the benefit of Ugandans.”* (Interviewee 4: Ugandan Economist in Multi-national Corporation.)

## 10.2 The impact of “Environmental Impact Assessments”

One of the pillars on which OfD is founded is the environmental aspects of the petroleum industry. I experienced this as being the most successful factor so far, in the sense that it has established forums where environmental aspects of the petroleum activities are discussed; forums that would not have existed at all without the Norwegian aid scheme. Oil for development did among other things, organize and finance the Strategic Environmental Assessments (SEA) for the oil and gas activities in Albertine Graben and stakeholder workshops for stakeholders for discussing the environmental impact. However, even the ones I talked to who were working for OfD, somewhat seemed to doubt whether the government in the end would follow the advice given on the bases of the SEA. One of the reasons they had for fearing that the environment would be given a low priority in a situation where economic interests compete against biodiversity, was the fact that test drilling was started before the SEA. This was seen as a bad omen by the people in OfD.



*“The challenge is also that the strategic environmental impact assessment report is coming in at the time when the benchmarks are more or less already set in place. The policies are in place. So ideally, this strategic environmental assessment (SEA) should inform the political discussion. You have a challenge of going back based on the SEA and changing and challenging the report and oil bill politically. And again it is a question of involvement. If you look at the process with the SEA, it is quite a long process. I think the ideal situation will be that a part from discussing this with cabinet, there should be an opportunity to discuss the pros and cons of the activities within political and public circles... and then based on that conversation or dialogue, they would have a commitment on the noble areas and come up with balanced commitment. But we are unlikely to see that kind of thing happen and petroleum interests are more likely to prevail over environmental concerns.” (Interviewee 3a: Norwegian Diplomat, (Group interview))*

My interviewees also meant that there is reason to fear an environmental resource curse, as a result of the deficits in Uganda’s democratic institutions. Public institutions like ministries and other public departments are all in a situation, where they silently have to obey the decisions from above. Authorities like the Ministry of water and Environment, Uganda Wildlife Authorities (UWA) and the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA) fail to perform their environmental watch dog responsibilities as they are very closely knit to the government:

*“It is very unlikely that Ministry of water and environment and NEMA or UWA will stand firm and strong on environmental issues as long as it conflicts with the petroleum bill. NEMA cannot.” (Interviewee 3b: Ugandan, human right lawyer. (Group interview))*

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*“They are puppets to the president (NEMA and UWA), deliberately covering for the elite in environmental debates or just plainly ignoring issues concerning the environment.” (Interviewee 6: Ugandan architect and city planner. (Written interview.) )*

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*“If they are being paid by government and if the jobs are under the government, in many ways if they make noise (protest) the government will go behind them and probably cut funding next financial year or talk to the directors of NEMA and threaten them about losing their job. I think that sometimes NEMA will not come out and say the truth of a matter.”* (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)

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*Being under a ministry, these are appointed by the president. Some of them do not qualify to being those positions. Because you are a member of parliament and you are a friend to the president. Then he puts you as head of a ministry. You are not knowledgeable but he puts you as head of the ministry. Because of corruption in the government you find people holding positions that they are not qualified for. People put people in positions where they are not supposed to be but just because they know each other. They dance to the tunes of their bosses.* (Interviewee 7: Administrator, Microfinance. Ugandan)

There also seemed to be a consensus that the neopatrimonial political structure enables the top elite are free to seek economic gain on the cost of the country's biodiversity, as long as it doesn't conflict with the interests of the man above.

*“Another thing about him being in power for all these years is that he has created division within the society, the opposition and civil society and the government and tribes. He dictates whatever he wants. He does not give people that chance to voice their opinion or have a say. For example almost all our wetlands are being built in. If he says this belongs to you, that is for development....that belongs to this investor...etc one cannot say no because he is a dictator. This has affected our environment.”* (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)

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*“...if a particular wetland is not owned by one of the “big guys” they will actually go ahead and evict people from it. And say no this is a wetland you cannot construct in it or carry out these activities. But if it is one of them or if they are getting orders from above then they will keep quiet and the public can make a lot of noise but they will keep quiet. I think that it would be nice to have an independent organization to act as a watch dog or guard for the environment.”*

*“When you say “one of them” what/whom do you mean?”*

*“I mean someone that knows someone in the government. Or it’s a big business person that probably contributed to the government during their campaigns/elections. So they have been given orders not be tampered with.” (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)*

However, the fact that OfD has managed to establish some forums for environmental dialogue between agents, that would probably not exist without them, does raise some hope concerning the future extraction; not the least because international oil companies such as Total and Tullow oil want to keep bad publicity at a minimum. The fact that OfD has financed an extensive environmental impact assessment also opens up the opportunity for an environmental debate that could not have occurred without the data presented in the strategic environmental assessments for the oil and gas activities in Albertine Graben.



## 11. Conclusion

Many of the Ugandans I talked to did not believe in PPD's perception that oil can "fast-track the economic and social transformation process." When analysing Uganda's preconditions for resource management, by looking at leading theories on resource management/curses and transformative politics, it becomes clear that they do have a well-grounded reason to worry about a resource curse.

The biggest obstacle for oil revenues to become a source of transformation in Uganda's present political system is the democratic deficits in its power structures. When we look at the experiences of the most naturally comparable oil countries in Uganda's neighboring regions like Angola and Equatorial Guinea, we see how big obstacle neopatrimonial power structures are to development. Among the five factors Carothers identifies that drastically reduce the chances to achieve transformation is lack of experience with political pluralism. Today the majority of Uganda's young population has only known one president. Museveni came into power in 1986. During the NRM caucus in February 2014, Museveni was endorsed as the party's presidential candidate also for the 2016 election. As unsurprising as that was, it still seems like bad news for anything dependent on good governance or political pluralism, as "good governance is at the heart of all effective resource management." (Donyinah in Appiah-Adu 2013 : 23).

The chances are big that large parts of the revenues will end up in private pockets of political elites as a result of corruption and political accumulation of public funds. There is therefore, a risk of oil revenues creating even more economic inequality. Prices have a tendency to grow as a result of high revenues due to natural resource export, which in that case might mean that the poor become poorer as a result of the oil-industry. This was also a concern for my informants, as revenues from other sectors, notably tourism and fishing, can be conflicting with the gas and oil activities. Unlike its competing interests petroleum industry in itself doesn't create the same trickle-down effect:

*“Oil money goes to the government and in this country, we have issues of corruption and governance, and one wonders what will be the impact. Whereas when you think of tourism money, the person is able to get it. From the people that work in the hotels, to the guide, the communities and drivers. There, it is tangible and you see a change in their lives.”* (Interviewee 5: Ugandan business women, owner of Safari Company.)

Uganda made a lot of progress in terms of governance and democratization during the period that has been referred to as “the third global wave of democracy”. This is probably also the reason why Norwegian aid has been so heavily involved in Uganda up to now. However, looking at the political situation of today it is noticeable that the democratization process has stagnated. Lately, we even see clear signs that both the democratization process and the human rights situation are declining.

There is strong evidence that for a democracy to work in the sense that it secures fair and inclusive development, the whole constituency must be able to make their voices heard. In many “democracies” today, popular representation from the demos is suppressed. Elites in democracies without any real sense of pluralism seem to be able to craft democracies into systems that just work to renew and legitimate their domination over other parts of the demos. The Ugandan democracy has proved to be crafted to that extent. The young Yoweri Museveni might have been right when he in 1986 declared that “Africa’s problem and Uganda’s in particular is leaders that overstay in power”. But contrary to what was widely believed during that time, the third wave of democracy did not only create a new foundation for authoritarianism, but together with the market driven globalisation from the 1980’s until today it also “swept away many preconditions for political advances” (Stokke & Törnquist 2013 : 3). It is hard to imagine substantial democratization that doesn’t also deal with closing the equity gap in some way or another. It is also hard to imagine oil revenues laying a base for social transformation; if a more substantial system of power sharing and equality is not first established between Uganda’s tribes, ethnical groups and individuals.

Looking at the last three decades, the sitting regime has showed little will for revenue sharing.

High concentration of sources in wealth income is one of five factors that work's against the goal of social transformation (Carothers 2007 : 24). Luanda, the capital of Angola is now one of the world's most expensive cities despite its huge majority of people living in poverty. Angola and Equatorial Guinea have both become increasingly authoritarian. Looking at the experiences of other oil-countries, we find that oil and gas revenues hinder social and political transformation.

When Norwegian petroleum aid aims to use Norway's good reputation within the resource management field to assist Uganda in establishing a well working oil and gas sector, it is important to identify what distinguished the preconditions in countries that managed to create success stories in resource management from the countries with a resource curse. The Norwegian model for oil and gas management arose on the basis of a process of transformative politics that had been ongoing in the country for several decades. It is hard to imagine that the model used for resource management, including technocratic solutions such as the oil fund and Norwegian licensing policies would ever have emerged had it not been for this transformation.

By not going further back in Norway's transformative process, the "success story" loses the multidimensional broader explanation for the transformative politics that enabled Norway to create such a successful system of resource management.

In Uganda, OfD is assisting a regime which has visible deficits when it comes to democratization, in a time when conditions are growing increasingly hard for anyone in opposition. The question is then why the democratic foundation of Norway's resource management success is so downplayed in OfD's discourse. It is remarkable how the substantial democratization process that made up the foundation of Norway's own resource management success has vanished from

the “success-story” presented, when the argument for OfD is to assist developing countries to develop with knowledge based on Norway’s experiences where broad labor unions succeeded in dealing with the equity issue by wage compression as a result of collective bargaining. Museveni on the contrary, has for years been suppressing any labor-union activity and opposition that can challenge his hegemonic power (Beckman 2004 : 148).

OfD is sent by Norway to assist Ugandan policymakers in establishing a framework that will help Uganda to translate oil resources to equitable development. To achieve that, OfD seem to address all relevant issues concerning Ugandan petroleum management except for the most important and maybe the only one that really matters in the prevailing situation; the lack of substantial democracy.

The fact that resource curse theories have achieved the recognition they have today puts public pressure on every leader of a country faced with the prospect of those kinds of resources, to prevent this phenomenon from happening in their country. Norway has through its successful resource management, gained worldwide recognition in the field. Oil for development is an opportunity to promote substantial democratization in developing countries that are establishing oil and gas activities. In this, Norway might have a golden opportunity to be a strong advocate for democratization and egalitarianism, but OfD seem instead to have become depoliticized and focus mainly on the technocratic solutions.

*“Simply copying or adopting policies that have been effective elsewhere rarely succeeds. Many resource rich developing countries have experimented with oil funds or stabilization programs—with disappointing results.”*(World Bank, 2005)

From an ethical perspective, it can be problematic to only teach half the truth about Norway’s resource management policies. Promoting policies in other countries today which are not founded on democratic transformative politics does not only risk depriving people in developing countries their chance of having the



same level of welfare that Norwegians take for granted but can also foster un-inclusive development and legitimate the unbeneficial structures that are preventing inclusive development in the first place.

*“Many development strategies aim at being politically objective in an attempt to not upset any of the possible funders of development aid. But when failing to recognize that development is highly political they fail to reach sustainable solutions on inclusive economic development.” (Moene & Wallerstein 2006 : 19)*

Reluctance to politicize petroleum aid might end up making the wrong actors able to politicize the aid to their benefit. This can be unfortunate, at least if the overarching aim of the aid is helping the demos in the receiving countries and not befriending oil rich dictators.



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# Appendix

## Illustrations



Illustration I: Former Minister of Environment and Development Erik Solheim, together with former Minister of Industry Trond Giske, at Luanda's shining new waterfront in Angola. (Foto Håkon Eikesdal, i Dagbladet [online]. –URL [http://www.dagbladet.no/2011/11/29/nyheter/angola/erik\\_solheim/trond\\_giske\\_and\\_haakon/bistand/19189536/](http://www.dagbladet.no/2011/11/29/nyheter/angola/erik_solheim/trond_giske_and_haakon/bistand/19189536/))



Illustration II: Opposition leader Dr. Kizza Besigye arrested. (Photo: Red Pepper [online]. –URL <http://www.redpepper.co.ug/besigye-arrested-over-riot-plans/>)



Illustration III: A young man receiving nearly 100,000 USD worth of cash on behalf of a youth organization from President Museveni. (Photo: AP in Huffington Post [online].

–URL [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/yoweri-museveni-uganda\\_n\\_3139281.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/23/yoweri-museveni-uganda_n_3139281.html))



Illustration IV: Lord Mayor of Kampala Erias Lukwago arrested. (Photo: UGO News [online]. –URL <http://news.ugo.co.ug/police-arrests-lord-mayor-erias-lukwago/>)



Illustration V: Museveni posters displayed around Kampala, all year around. Private photo.



## Interview guide

This is the interview guide which made up the basis of my interviews. However, since my interviewees were professionals in different development fields, questions were added and removed before every interview in order to get the chance of having the interviewee talk about her/his field of expertise.

1. How would you describe the leading Ugandan political economical ideology and Uganda's strategy for achieving economic development?
2. What are the leading guidelines when it comes to distribution of public funds in Uganda?
3. Are there some sectors that receive more support than others?
4. In your opinion, how is today's bureaucratic and political system in Uganda suited for handling a substantial increase in income due to oil and gas activities? And which results do you see as a probable outcome of this industry?
5. Which measures are being taken in the economical field to prevent Uganda from becoming a new name on the list of countries in the Great Lakes Region with a resource curse?
6. How does it affect environmental issues/perspective in Uganda that the country for the last three decades has been led by only one leader, when this has been a very developmental growth focused leader facing no opposition substantial enough to compete about power?\_
7. Do you see any links between democratization and environmental protection in the country?

8. What seems to be prioritized in developmental/economic issues/goals where short term economic growth and environmental protection are competing?
9. Did you experience the protests against "the Mabira forest giveaway" as environmental protests, or did they have other more important political ethnical or social implications?
10. Do you think anything like this will happen again if oil drilling is ruining the national parks?
11. Is there more military presence now in Kampala and the country than there was during the Mabira riots?
12. How do you see the democratization process progressing in Uganda?
13. The freedom of press is a sub-category of the freedom of speech. Many of the people I have talked to have told me that the lack of opposition to the government is a result of a considerable danger connected to criticizing the regime.  
Do you think Norway is setting other standards for democracy on other continents, by partnering with an authoritarian and nepotistic regime that repeatedly breaks international conventions?  
How much further do you think the regime should be able to go without introducing more democratic rule and still expect aid from Norway?